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ARTICLE
THE RESIDENCY MATCH:
COMPETITIVE RESTRAINTS IN AN
IMPERFECT WORLD
Kristin Madison*
ABSTRACT
In 2002 physicians filed a lawsuit alleging that “the match,”
the more than fifty-year-old system by which medical students
and other applicants are assigned to medical residency programs,
violates section 1 of the Sherman Act. Last year, without
hearings on the issue, Congress found that the match was
“highly efficient” and “pro-competitive” and granted a retroactive
antitrust exemption for its operation. These seemingly
incompatible views invite further analysis of the merits of the
residency match from the perspective of public policy. This
Article considers the arguments of match advocates and critics,
evaluating both theoretical models and empirical evidence of the
effects of the match on resident compensation. It rejects the
assertion that matching mechanisms are necessarily inefficient,
and instead describes factors that should be considered in an
assessment of efficiency. The Article concludes that given the role
of the residency match in remedying market imperfections, the
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congressional grant of an exemption was justified. It also
suggests, however, that further action may be required to ensure
that the matching process obtains the maximum possible social
benefit.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Medical education has long been a subject of controversy,
and with good reason: The stakes associated with the medical
education process are unquestionably high. They are high for
physicians, who invest considerable money, time, and effort in
training, and whose investment return will reflect the nature and
quality of training they receive. Stakes are high for teaching
hospitals, which depend on medical residents to provide care
within their facilities. Stakes are also high for governments,
insurance companies, employers, and others who take on the
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responsibility of paying for services provided by teaching
hospitals. Finally, stakes are high for patients, the immediate
beneficiaries of residents’ services and the ultimate beneficiaries
of residents’ training, whose length and quality of life depend on
the quality of medical education. With so much at stake for so
many, it is not surprising that the interests of many individuals
and institutions, including physicians, hospitals, and
governments, have shaped the medical education process. It is
also not surprising that conflicts over this process have emerged.
One of the most closely watched conflicts in recent years has
been the 2002 lawsuit challenging the residency “match” as a
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.1 The residency match is
the system by which fourth-year medical school students and
other applicants are matched to residency programs across the
country. Each year, residency candidates submit a list of
preferred residency programs, and residency programs submit a
list of preferred residency candidates. A computer algorithm
designed to satisfy match participants’ mutual preferences then
assigns individual candidates to residency positions. Pointing to
resident compensation that has been relatively static across time
and low compared to that of nonresident physicians and other
health care professionals, the lawsuit plaintiffs alleged that the
match (along with residency program accreditation requirements
and the exchange of compensation information) illegally
restrained competition.2
1. See Complaint, Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119 (D.D.C.
2004) (No. CIV.A.02-0873 PLF) [hereinafter Complaint], http://www.savethematch.org/
pdf/complaint.pdf. For legal analyses of the suit, see Sanders H. Chae, Is the Match
Illegal?, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 352 (2003); Frances H. Miller & Thomas L. Greaney, The
National Resident Matching Program and Antitrust Law, 289 JAMA 913 (2003)
(explaining the history of the match and the legal principles relevant to the Jung suit);
Heather S. Crall, Note, Unreasonable Restraints: Antitrust Law and the National
Residency Matching Program, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 245 (2004); and Melinda Creasman, Note,
Resuscitating the National Resident Matching Program: Improving Medical Resident
Placement Through Binding Dual Matching, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1439 (2003) (arguing that
the Jung antitrust claims are meritorious and proposing an alternative matching
mechanism).
2. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 1–2. More specifically, the complaint alleged that
the defendants violated section 1 of the Sherman Act in three ways. Id. ¶¶ 3, 97–103.
First, the defendants exchanged information about medical residencies through various
mechanisms, including an annual survey that aggregated salary information across
residency programs. Id. ¶¶ 3, 73–82, 100. Second, the defendants operated or participated
in the match. Id. ¶¶ 3, 83–86, 100. Third, in implementing accreditation standards, the
organization responsible for accrediting residency programs limited the number of
residency positions available, hindered resident movement among these positions,
encouraged match participation, and reviewed employment terms. Id. ¶¶ 3, 87–88, 100.
The complaint claimed that the defendants’ alleged information exchange, match
program, and accreditation activities had “the purpose and effect of artificially fixing,
depressing, standardizing and stabilizing resident physician compensation and other
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The plaintiffs, physicians who had participated in the match,
3
sought damages and an injunction against antitrust violations.
Among the defendants were the National Resident Matching
Program (NRMP), which operates the match; the Accreditation
Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), which
accredits residency programs; the Association of American
Medical Colleges (AAMC), an NRMP sponsor which conducts an
annual survey of resident compensation; and individual,
nonpublic teaching hospitals, which participate in the match and
employ residents.4
A plaintiff victory in the suit would have had profound
implications for the graduate medical education system, affecting
each of the stakeholders in the medical education process. In the
short term, an award of damages would have benefited former
residents but depleted the resources of defendant teaching
hospitals. In the long term, if the plaintiffs were correct in
5
arguing that the match depresses compensation, an injunction
against the continued operation of the match would have
resulted in a further transfer of resources from teaching
hospitals to residents. The potential effects of abolishing the
residency match, however, would have been confined neither to
compensation issues, nor to match participants. Because the
residency match affects the output of residency programs,
including resident training, patient services, and medical
research,6 its abolition would have affected society more broadly.
Whether these effects would have been on balance beneficial or
detrimental remains an open question.
Congress made no attempt to resolve this question publicly
when in 2004 it created an antitrust exemption for the residency
7
match. Versions of the Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004
terms of employment.” Id. ¶ 101.
3. Id. ¶¶ 1, 10–13.
4. Id. ¶¶ 15–17, 22–50. In February 2004, the district court allowed the suit to go
forward with respect to defendants National Residency Matching Program (NRMP),
Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME), and Association of
American Medical Colleges (AAMC), as well as many of the individual teaching hospitals.
Jung, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 173–74. The court granted the motions to dismiss some
defendants, including the American Hospital Association, the American Medical
Association, the Council of Medical Specialty Societies, and the American Board of
Medical Specialties. Id. These four organizations and the AAMC together sponsor the
NRMP. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 17–21. The court later dismissed the case. See infra
note 13 and accompanying text.
5. See supra note 2.
6. See Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education, ACGME Fact Sheet,
http://www.acgme.org/acWebsite/newsRoom/newsRm_factSheet.asp (last visited Oct. 1,
2005) (describing the functions of residency programs).
7. Pension Funding Equity Act of 2004 § 207, 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b (West Supp. 2005).
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passed both the House and Senate with no mention of any
residency-related antitrust exemption.8 It was not until the final
bill emerged from the conference committee that a section
captioned “Confirmation of Antitrust Status of Graduate Medical
Resident Matching Programs” first appeared.9 This section,
which applies to conduct both before and after the law’s
10
passage, states that “[i]t shall not be unlawful under the
antitrust laws to sponsor, conduct, or participate in a graduate
medical education residency matching program,”11 and prohibits
the admission of match-related evidence to support an antitrust
claim.12 The match antitrust suit defendants moved for judgment
on the pleadings, and in August 2004, the district court
13
dismissed the case. Despite its powerful effect, the statute was
signed into law without debate concerning the antitrust
exemption either in the Senate Judiciary Committee or on the
14
House or Senate floors, a state of affairs that elicited strong
objections from several senators. Senator Kohl, for example, said
that
[i]n general it is bad policy to provide exemptions to the
antitrust laws. . . . We should have had the opportunity to
debate this issue and determine whether there was any
merit to the exemption, rather than see the exemption
mysteriously appear on an unrelated bill. It appears that
this provision, enacted in this way, is nothing more than a
giveaway to one particular special interest. Without judging

8. See Pension Funding Equity Act of 2003, H.R. 3108, 108th Cong. (as passed by
House, Oct. 8, 2003); Pension Stability Act, H.R. 3108, 108th Cong. (as passed by Senate,
Jan. 28, 2004).
9. See H.R. REP. NO. 108-457, at 17 (2004) (Conf. Rep.).
10. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b(c) (“This section shall take effect on April 10, 2004, shall
apply to conduct whether it occurs prior to, on, or after April 10, 2004, and shall apply to
all judicial and administrative actions or other proceedings pending on April 10, 2004.”).
11. Id. § 37b(b)(2).
12. Id. (“Evidence of any of the conduct described in the preceding sentence shall
not be admissible in Federal court to support any claim or action alleging a violation of
the antitrust laws.”).
13. Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 339 F. Supp. 2d 26, 46–47 (D.D.C. 2004). After
determining that the plaintiffs’ claims of antitrust conspiracy hinged on allegations
related to the match, and that the newly enacted statute prohibited the admission of
match-related evidence, the court dismissed the case. Id. at 36–39. The court also rejected
the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to the antitrust exemption statutory provisions.
Id. at 40–46. In February 2005, the court rejected a request to reconsider the dismissal;
the plaintiffs subsequently filed notice to appeal. Myrle Croasdale, Judge Upholds
Dismissal of Match Lawsuit, AM. MED. NEWS, Feb. 14, 2005, at 20, 20.
14. See 149 CONG. REC. H9285 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 2003); 150 CONG. REC. S223 (daily
ed. Jan. 26, 2004).
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the merits of the issue, we should have had an opportunity
15
to explore it and make that decision for ourselves.

This Article assesses the merits of the antitrust exemption
by analyzing whether the residency match is desirable from a
policy perspective. Only with a thorough understanding of the
potential effects of the residency match can it be determined
whether the exemption was improvidently granted and should
therefore be modified or eliminated.16 Building on an analysis of
arguments on both sides of the residency match debate, this
Article explores the implications of the residency match for social
welfare.
At the core of the plaintiffs’ complaint is the allegation that
17
the residency match has depressed compensation; mean
resident compensation levels are mostly in the $40,000 range.18
The role of the residency match in determining these
compensation levels, however, is unclear. Match rules restrict the
timing of offers and govern the matching of residents to
19
programs, but say nothing whatsoever about resident stipends.
The complaint alleged that the match “enabled employers to
obtain resident physicians without . . . a bidding war,”20 but failed
to detail the precise mechanism by which the match depresses
compensation.
This Article explores several ways in which the rules of the
match, though silent on compensation issues, may nonetheless
affect compensation levels. Match rules restricting the formation
15. 150 CONG. REC. S3979 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004). While there was no public debate
on the exemption, it is likely that there was considerable discussion in private among
legislators, legislative staff, and representatives of the affected parties.
16. Senator Jeff Bingaman, who has criticized the creation of the exemption and
argued that the exemption does not apply to claims of price fixing, has said in a floor
statement that he “will seek a future opportunity to raise this issue before this body.” 150
CONG. REC. S5223 (daily ed. May 11, 2004). In addition, the Antitrust Modernization
Commission, a twelve-member commission appointed by the President and congressional
leaders, Antitrust Modernization Commission Act of 2002 § 11054(a)(1)–(5), 15 U.S.C. § 1
(Supp. II 2002), has proposed evaluating whether industry-specific exemptions, including
the residency match exemption, should be eliminated or time-limited. Memorandum from
the Immunities & Exemptions Working Group to All Comm’rs 2–6 (Dec. 21, 2004), http://
www.amc.gov/pdf/meetings/ImmunitiesandExemptions.pdf.
17. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 73, 83–84.
18. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., 2004 AAMC SURVEY OF HOUSESTAFF STIPENDS,
BENEFITS & FUNDING: NOVEMBER 2004 REPORT 6 tbl.2 (2004), http://www.aamc.org/data/
housestaff/hss2004report.pdf. See infra Part IV for an assessment of the empirical data on
resident compensation.
19. See NRMP, Match Participation Agreement for Applicants and Programs § 1.0
(2005), http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/policies/map_main.html (describing the functions
of the matching program and noting that “the NRMP is not involved in establishing the
terms of any residency or fellowship agreement”).
20. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 84.
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of early contracts undermine the credibility of early offers and
other expressions of interest, limiting the ability of residency
candidates to use them to solicit other offers or to bargain for
increased compensation.21 Furthermore, several models in the
theoretical economics literature indicate that under certain
conditions, matching mechanisms can result in lower
compensation, suggesting that there may be a basis for the
plaintiffs’ claim that the match is anticompetitive.22
At the same time, however, the match facilitates competition
by overcoming market failures that reduce the probability of
forming efficient matches. Centralized matching mechanisms
help ensure efficient pairings of residency programs and
residents by delaying the competitive process, thus improving
match participants’ access to information, and by taking full
23
account of participants’ preferences. If Congress was correct in
its characterization of the matching process as “highly efficient”
and “pro-competitive,”24 then by facilitating efficient pairings the
match expands the “output” of resident-residency program
relationships. This increase in output could conceivably support
an increase in resident compensation relative to a world without
25
the match, and would certainly increase social welfare.
In a recent article, however, Professor George Priest has
argued that mechanisms that impose restrictions on offer timing,
like many other types of competitive restraint, actually reduce
26
aggregate welfare. To the extent that Priest’s arguments apply
to the residency match, they reinforce the plaintiffs’ claims that
the match is anticompetitive. This Article argues, however, that
while Priest’s work provides important insights, it does not
conclusively demonstrate that early-offer restrictions reduce
welfare, particularly in the context of medical residencies. While
some match participants might gain from early-offer competition,
a significant portion of these gains would result from the
redistribution of resources among market participants, rather
than an increase in aggregate welfare. An overall assessment of

21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See infra Part III.B.
24. One of the congressional findings is that “[a]ntitrust lawsuits challenging the
matching process, regardless of their merit or lack thereof, have the potential to
undermine this highly efficient, pro-competitive, and long-standing process.” 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 37b(a)(1)(E) (West Supp. 2005).
25. See infra Part III.B.
26. George L. Priest, Reexamining the Market for Judicial Clerks and Other
Assortative Matching Markets, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 123, 204 (2005); see also infra Part
III.C (responding to Professor Priest’s article).
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welfare requires a careful weighing of the many factors affecting
the benefits and costs associated with timing restrictions.
Much of the work examining the effects of matching
mechanisms, both supportive and critical, has focused on the
nature of the matching process and the quality of matches
achieved, rather than on the potential interaction between
matching mechanisms and compensation. This focus is natural,
given that the match itself places no direct constraints on
compensation. But if the match does affect compensation, it is
important to consider the relationship between these effects and
efficiency. This Article explains that institutional features of the
residency market tend to limit the impact of lower compensation
levels, and suggests that any such impact may be outweighed by
the benefits reaped through the use of the matching mechanism.
Critics of the match may argue that such a sanguine
appraisal of the effects of the match is inappropriate, given the
low level of resident compensation relative to that of other health
care professionals.27 These differences may result from a variety
of factors unrelated to the match, however, including differences
in productivity levels, nonmonetary compensation in the form of
training, and the value of the opportunity to enter the medical
profession. While not conclusive, empirical comparisons of
markets with and without matching mechanisms support the
argument that the match does not significantly affect
compensation.
Ultimately, this Article’s analysis suggests that Congress
was justified in stepping into the residency match controversy.
Given its decision, however, Congress also has an obligation to
assure that society gains the maximum possible benefit from the
match. Toward this end, this Article proposes that Congress
adopt measures that would require programs to offer binding
sample contracts prior to the match and facilitate the creation of
individually-negotiated contracts.
Part II of this Article explains the medical education process
and the mechanics of the residency match. Part III explores the
effects of the match on competition and efficiency. Section A
discusses ways in which the match might depress compensation,
while section B explains the argument that matching
mechanisms benefit their participants by generating higherquality matches than could otherwise be obtained. Section C
expands on the analysis in the previous sections by evaluating

27. See discussion infra Part IV (comparing resident compensation with that of
other health care providers).
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the extent to which the match might be an economically efficient
institution, using as a starting point Professor George Priest’s
recent work analyzing assortative matching markets.28 Section D
considers the relationship between compensation and efficiency
in the context of the residency match. Part IV assesses the
empirical evidence on resident compensation. Part V
recommends that Congress preserve the antitrust exemption, but
proposes additional regulations that would facilitate competition.
Part VI concludes.
II. MEDICAL EDUCATION AND THE MATCH
To understand the conflict over the match, it is important to
first understand the rigorous and lengthy formal training process
that transforms college graduates into physicians. It begins with
enrollment in medical school.29 While medical school curriculums
vary, they generally include two years of basic science education
30
in areas such as anatomy, biochemistry, and microbiology. This
coursework is followed by two years of clinical rotations, during
which students work with patients in supervised settings in
practice areas such as internal medicine, psychiatry, and
surgery.31
The training required to become a fully licensed physician
extends beyond the clinical exposure in medical school. Medical
school graduates must first receive the more intensive training
offered by residency programs, which focus on developing the
clinical skills and detailed knowledge necessary to provide high32
quality medical care within a specialized field. Providing
services to patients is an integral part of the educational
process.33 The length of residency programs varies by specialty;
internal medicine residencies last three years, while a basic
28. Priest, supra note 26.
29. To prepare for medical school, college students generally take numerous basic
sciences courses, including biology, chemistry, and physics. See Am. Med. Ass’n, Becoming
an MD: How Do You Become a Physician?, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/
14365.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). Most medical schools consider Medical College
Admission Test (MCAT) scores as part of the highly competitive admissions process; the
MCAT tests proficiency in the biological and physical sciences, among other areas. See
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., About the MCAT, http://www.aamc.org/students/mcat/about/
start.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
30. See Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., Curriculum Directory, http://services.aamc.org/
currdir/about.cfm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (describing the medical education process).
31. Id.
32. AM. MED. ASS’N, GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION DIRECTORY 9 (2003).
33. See id. at 10 (explaining that “[t]he education of resident physicians relies on an
integration of didactic activity in a structured curriculum with diagnosis and
management of patients”).
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surgery program may last five years.34 Training within a
subspecialty may extend physicians’ formal education process by
several more years.35 A physician seeking specialized training in
cardiology, for example, might first participate in an internal
medicine residency program and then spend three years in a
cardiovascular disease program.36
Before physicians may practice independently, they must
obtain a license from the state in which they intend to practice.37
Standards for licensure vary by state, but generally include
graduation from medical school, successful completion of an
exam, and completion of at least one year of postgraduate
38
training. Residents are therefore not generally permitted to
practice independently at the beginning of their residencies, but
they may become fully licensed before the end of their
39
residencies.
Most residency positions are assigned through the residency
match. In 2005, the match involved 3,813 programs offering
24,012 positions, and 31,862 applicants, including 15,308 2005
40
graduates of American medical schools. In their fourth year of
34. Id. at 423 (charting the length of time required for various medical specialties
and subspecialties).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 92 (general requirements for internal medicine subspecialties); id. at 97–
98 (specific requirements for residency education in cardiovascular disease); id. at 423
(program lengths).
37. See, e.g., N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, License Requirements, http://www.op.nysed.
gov/medlic.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (“Any use of the title ‘Physician’ or practice of
medicine within New York State requires licensure.”).
38. See, e.g., id. (describing New York’s requirements); N.D. State Bd. of Med.
Exam’rs, Physician Licensure Requirements, http://www.ndbomex.com/MD_Req.htm (last
visited Oct. 1, 2005) (listing North Dakota’s requirements).
39. While obtaining a license does not generally require successful completion of an
entire residency program, obtaining board certification in a discipline does. Residencies in
approved hospitals have been required by specialty boards since the 1930s. KENNETH M.
LUDMERER, TIME TO HEAL: AMERICAN MEDICAL EDUCATION FROM THE TURN OF THE
CENTURY TO THE ERA OF MANAGED CARE 87 (1999). These requirements continue today.
For example, the American Board of Internal Medicine requires that physicians complete
thirty-six months of training in an ACGME-accredited residency (or a residency
accredited by specified Canadian organizations) to obtain certification. Am. Bd. of
Internal Med., Certification Policies, Internal Medicine Policies, http://www.abim.org/cert/
policiesim.shtm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005). While board certification is not a requirement
for licensure or for practice in a specific area, it may be relevant to a patient’s choice of
provider, to a hospital’s decision about the scope of a physician’s practice within its
facility, to an insurer’s decision about the makeup of its provider panel, or to an insurer’s
decision about the provision of malpractice insurance.
40. NRMP, About the NRMP, http://www.nrmp.org/about_nrmp/index.html (last
visited Oct. 1, 2005) [hereinafter NRMP, About the NRMP]. The match involves more
than just fourth-year medical students and first-year residency positions. Match
participants also include previous American medical school graduates seeking residency
positions and physicians educated outside of American medical schools. NRMP,
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medical school, students submit applications to residency
programs. Most programs permit electronic submissions of
applications and other supporting materials, including personal
statements, recommendations, and transcripts, beginning in
September.41 Programs invite selected applicants to on-site
interviews, during which programs and students can collect more
42
information about each other. Then, sometime in January or
February, programs submit to the NRMP confidential ordered
lists of their preferred applicants, and students submit
43
confidential ordered lists of their preferred programs. There is
no limit to the number of applicants or programs that may be
listed.44 Match rules prohibit participants from making
45
commitments prior to the match.
In March, a computer algorithm assigns matches of
programs and students based on the rank-order lists that have
46
been submitted. The algorithm begins by tentatively assigning
an applicant to the applicant’s first choice program, if that
program has listed the applicant and still has positions
available.47 If the first choice program has not listed the
applicant, the algorithm will attempt to assign the applicant to
48
his or her second choice program. Similarly, if the first choice

Independent Applicants, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/special_part/ind_app (last
updated Aug. 2004). Also, some residency positions offer advanced training and are not
open to first-year residents. See AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 32, at 39 (discussing
advanced training programs not available to first year residents in the field of
anesthesiology).
41. AAMC, Electronic Residency Application Service, Timeline, Deadlines and
Timing Issues, http://www.aamc.org/students/eras/timeline/start.htm (last visited Oct. 1,
2005).
42. See NRMP, The Application Process, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/about_res/
application_process.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (referring to programs’ interview
requirements).
43. See NRMP, Dates of NRMP Matches, http://www.nrmp.org/about_nrmp/
schedule.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (listing the dates that rank-order lists open and
close). The match also accommodates couples seeking to coordinate their position
searches. See NRMP, U.S. Seniors: Couples, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/special_part/
us_seniors/couples.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (describing the couples search
algorithm).
44. See Miller & Greaney, supra note 1, at 914 (explaining that up to fifteen
preferences are included in the registration fee for applicants, and that applicants may
rank additional preferences for thirty dollars per listing).
45. NRMP, supra note 19, § 6.0.
46. See NRMP, 2006 Main Match Schedule, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/yearly.
html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (indicating that match results will be posted on March 16,
2006); NRMP, How the Matching Algorithm Works, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/
about_res/algorithms.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) [hereinafter NRMP, How the
Matching Algorithm Works] (explaining the matching algorithm).
47. NRMP, How the Matching Algorithm Works, supra note 46.
48. Id.
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program has listed the applicant but the program is full and has
ranked all of its tentatively matched candidates more highly
than the applicant, the algorithm will attempt to assign the
applicant to his or her second choice program.49 On the other
hand, if the first choice program is full, but the program prefers
the applicant to at least one of its tentatively matched
candidates, the algorithm will tentatively assign the applicant to
the program.50 To accommodate this tentative assignment, the
algorithm will remove the program’s least-preferred tentatively
51
assigned candidate. The algorithm will subsequently attempt to
assign the dropped candidate to the next program on the dropped
candidate’s list.52 Through this iterative temporary-assignment
process, the algorithm ultimately ensures that each student is
admitted to the program he or she prefers the most if it is not
filled by students that the program prefers more. Students who
are left unmatched at the end of this process may reapply the
following year, or they may join the “Scramble” in which they
apply for positions that have remained unfilled.53
In 2005, about 94% of U.S. medical school seniors
participating in the match were assigned successfully,54 the
55
majority to their first-choice program. Applicants who are
matched are required to join their assigned programs.56 It is this
matching mechanism that is at the center of the antitrust
complaint.
III. IS THE MATCH ANTI- OR PROCOMPETITIVE?
A. The Anticompetitive Match
Although only recently challenged as a violation of antitrust
law, the residency match has been a feature of the medical

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. NRMP, Independent Applicants, http://www.nrmp.org/res_match/special_part/
ind_app/match_results.html (last visited October 1, 2005) (describing the “Scramble”).
54. Press Release, Nat’l Resident Matching Program, U.S. Medical School Seniors
Apply to Residency Programs in Record Numbers (Mar. 17, 2005), available at http://
www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/2005/050317.htm.
55. Among U.S. seniors who were matched, 62.5% received their first choice, 15.0%
their second choice, and 8.7% their third choice. The remaining 13.8% were matched with
their fourth-ranked program or lower. NRMP, Percent Matches by Rank Number, http://
www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/2005/matchcharts.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
56. See NRMP, supra note 19, § 5.1 (“Failure to honor this commitment by either
party participating in a match will be a material breach of this Agreement . . . .”).
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education system since 1951.57 The motivation for the adoption of
the match is controversial. In their complaint, the plaintiffs
allege that the match was intended to depress compensation in a
58
market in which the demand for residents exceeded the supply.
Specifically, they allege that
[i]n 1952, the hospitals and other entities employing
resident physicians determined that the continuation of
free competition in recruiting, hiring, employing and
compensating resident physicians was undesirable because
the number of available residency positions outpaced the
number of available candidates. Employers determined that
continued free competition would “bid up” compensation
and other terms of employment by which employers
commonly compete to attract employees. Creating the
matching program enabled employers to obtain resident
59
physicians without such a bidding war . . . .
In fact, the number of positions available to first-year
medical school graduates exceeded the number of applicants from
around the turn of the century, when postgraduate training was
first introduced, until the mid-1970s.60 The number of positions
continues to exceed the number of graduates from U.S. medical
schools (although not the total number of applicants).61 In a
competitive market, if demand exceeds supply of a good or
service, the price would ordinarily rise, and supply would
increase and demand would decrease, until the market
equilibrated.62 The surplus in residency positions therefore would
have placed upward pressure on the compensation offered to
applicants. In theory, then, the match may have been an
anticompetitive measure adopted in response to this pressure.63
By imposing constraints on the competitive process, the
residency match affects the nature of competition but does not
57. Alvin E. Roth, The Evolution of the Labor Market for Medical Interns and
Residents: A Case Study in Game Theory, 92 J. POL. ECON. 991, 992, 995–96 (1984).
58. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 84.
59. Id.
60. Roth, supra note 57, at 992–93 & 993 n.1.
61. See NRMP, About the NRMP, supra note 40 (reporting that in the 2005 match,
15,308 2005 U.S. graduates and 16,554 independent applicants applied for 24,012
positions).
62. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 55–61 (17th
ed. 2001) (discussing the general principles of supply and demand).
63. The ratios of applicants to available positions likely differ depending on the
nature of the position. To the extent that residency positions are imperfect substitutes for
one another, an excess supply of one type of position would not necessarily place upward
pressure on wages for another type of position. Programs with unfilled positions, however,
would have reason to advocate the adoption of a mechanism that might allow them to
obtain residents without having to increase compensation.
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eliminate it. Under a match system, programs compete indirectly
for residents by competing for high rank-orders. A program
might try to increase its place in applicants’ rank-orderings by
touting all of its positive attributes, including high compensation.
Anecdotal evidence in fact suggests that programs have competed
based on compensation in the post-match period.64 While match
rules prohibiting the creation of pre-match contracts preclude a
binding commitment to pay any particular level of compensation,
programs may disclose intended future program characteristics
65
to applicants. Students for whom compensation is important are
therefore likely to obtain compensation information before the
ranking process begins. It seems, then, that the main effect of the
match would be to shift the competitive process from the
employment offer stage to the rank-order stage. If this were the
only effect, the match would impose no downward pressure on
wages.
On the other hand, the nature of competition within the
match will not necessarily mirror the competition that would
occur outside of a match system. Imagine a labor market in
which skilled workers are in high demand. Imagine, furthermore,
that there is some uncertainty about the quality of applicants.
Some applicants will arrive with knowledge, skills, talents, and
experience that allow them to generate significant surpluses
(profits) for an employer through their efforts in the workplace;
those of lesser ability will generate lower surpluses. Even
candidates with similar educational backgrounds and formal
training may differ widely in their productivity. Assessing this
productivity is difficult and costly.
64. See LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 193.
Salary became a weapon in the efforts of teaching hospitals to recruit the best
house officers, particularly when they were competing against hospitals in the
same city or geographical region. . . . Jefferson Medical College, for instance,
repeatedly raised its house staff pay scale in response to competition from the
other Philadelphia teaching programs. Students and house officers reveled in
this competition. . . . [T]hey made their desire for higher incomes known, and
leaders of even the most prestigious programs had to listen.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
65. In the past, NRMP rules precluded pre-match contracts but encouraged
information disclosure. For example, the August 26, 2002 “Policies of the NRMP” states
that “any verbal or written contracts prior to the submission of Rank Order Lists is [sic] a
violation of the Match,” (policy 8.0) but that “programs are expected to provide complete
and accurate information to interviewees, including a sample contract and institutional
policies regarding eligibility for appointment to a residency position” (policy 6.2). Policies
of the NRMP (2002) (on file with author). In 2003, the NRMP decided to require programs
participating in the match to disclose before the rank-order list deadline the contract that
successfully matched applicants would be expected to sign. Press Release, Nat’l Resident
Matching Program, NRMP Requires Medical Residency Programs to Show Contracts to
Applicants (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://www.nrmp.org/contractpr.pdf.
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In this setting, a job candidate may visit several potential
employers. A potential employer evaluates the candidate’s
credentials and decides to make an offer, say for $50,000, because
it believes that the candidate can produce more than $50,000 in
benefit for the employer. The existence of an offer that would be
contractually binding if accepted communicates to other similarly
situated employers that according to one assessment, the
candidate would produce more than $50,000 in surplus. An
employment offer with compensation attached is a signal of the
candidate’s minimum quality. To the extent that the employers’
needs are similar, a competing employer could use this
information as a baseline for making its own offer. It could use
the existence of outside offers as a low-cost way of sorting more
productive from less productive candidates, and then conduct a
further assessment to determine whether the candidate would
likely produce even more than $50,000 in surplus for its own
organization. If so, it could make the candidate an offer of more
than $50,000. The candidate could then return to the initial
offeror, or move on to other potential employers, to solicit a still
more lucrative offer. In an ordinary competitive labor market,
workers can use offers from one potential employer to extract
offers and higher compensation from competing potential
employers.66
In the residency match setting, residents cannot take full
advantage of this type of bargaining in order to increase either
the likelihood of competing offers or the amount of compensation,
benefits, or other perks. Residents may certainly suggest to
programs that their benefits packages are not as attractive as
those of other programs, but they cannot negotiate with an
67
employer from a position of strength based on a competing offer.
Programs participating in the match are not permitted to form a
contract outside of the match for a position that is to be allocated

66. In this scenario, later potential employers are able to free ride off of the initial
potential employer’s investment in assessing the quality of the employee. Not only does
the initial employer bear the full cost of that investment, but by making an offer it invites
competition for the services of the employee. The initial employer could try to limit the
employee’s ability to seek competing offers by holding the offer open for only a short time,
but to prevent the free-riding problem the employer would have to find a way to prevent
disclosure of the existence of the offer. The discussion of this scenario assumes that
employers would not successfully do so.
67. Dr. Sanders Chae makes this point when he argues that “[w]ithout an offer in
hand, students have no power to negotiate with the programs, and programs do not need
to compete for residents through salary or other monetary benefits.” Chae, supra note 1,
at 353. This passage overstates the case, however. To the extent that residents care about
the immediate monetary benefits of a residency position, programs have an incentive to
compete to attract high rankings from students they prefer.
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through the match process.68 Nor are match participants
permitted to solicit information about rank-orderings from one
another.69 While it is permissible to volunteer ranking
70
information, and it is conceivable that a program would make
an offer prior to the match for a position included in the match,
neither action would constitute a credible commitment. Positions
are allocated based solely on rank-orderings actually submitted,
not on rank-orderings compiled previously or other information.71
Commitments become binding only after the match takes place.72
As a result, any information provided before the match is suspect
and cannot be used in the same way that formal offers are used
in a more conventional workplace setting—to solicit an offer or
improve on a compensation package.
Although there is no formal sanction for deviating from a
suggested rank-ordering or benefits package, reputational
73
A
sanctions may discourage misleading representations.
program that widely advertises that it will offer a high level of
compensation or adopt a particularly attractive feature, for
example, might face a decline in applications from suspicious
future applicants if it later reverses its decision. If reputational
sanctions are effective, nonbinding commitments may be helpful
to a candidate in the same way formal offers would be.
Employment negotiations typically occur at the individual
level, however, where reputational sanctions may be less
effective. In fact, studies suggest that reputational sanctions (if
any) have been unsuccessful in deterring misleading behavior

68. NRMP, Match Participation Agreement for Institutions § 4.2, http://www.nrmp.
org/res_match/policies/map_institution.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
69. NRMP, supra note 19, § 6.0.
70. See id.
71. Section 8.0 of the NRMP’s Match Participation Agreement for Institutions reads
in part as follows:
It is a material breach of this Agreement and of the Match Participation
Agreement . . . for a program that is participating in the Matching Program to make
any verbal or written contract for appointment to a concurrent year residency
position prior to the Matching Program. In addition, although applicants or
programs may volunteer how they plan to rank each other, it is a material breach of
this Agreement and of the Match Participation Agreement . . . to request such
information. Only the final preferences of programs and applicants, as reflected in
their final certified rank order lists, will determine the offering of positions and the
placement of applicants through the Matching Program.
NRMP, supra note 68, § 8.0.
72. See NRMP, supra note 19, § 5.1 (noting that a binding commitment is
established if a successful match results).
73. See id. § 4.3 (indicating that although “programs are expected to provide
complete and accurate information to interviewees,” the “NRMP is not responsible for
ensuring the accuracy of information exchanged between applicants and programs”).
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that occurs within the context of the match. For example, over
seventy percent of one survey’s respondents agreed with a
statement that “[a]pplicants often make dishonest or misleading
assurances or statements to programs about their level of
interest.”74 Another survey-based study reports that more than
ninety percent of family practice program directors believed that
75
applicants had occasionally lied to them. Program directors may
also engage in misleading behavior; the same family practice
program survey found that while almost no directors would lie to
candidates asking about the programs’ rankings of candidates,
the majority would give only a vague response, and a significant
number would give a “vague but positive response” to low-ranked
applicants.76 In this setting, applicants would be unlikely to be
able to use information about competing programs’ prospective
rankings as an effective negotiation tool.77
The implication of the match’s restrictions and the
participants’ behavior is that there is little foundation for
negotiation with individual candidates.78 An applicant cannot
wait until a program makes an offer and then try to gain a larger
percentage of the surplus created by the match through

74. John Bernard Miller et al., Communication Between Programs and Applicants
During Residency Selection: Effects of the Match on Medical Students’ Professional
Development, 78 ACAD. MED. 403, 408 (2003). The majority of students also thought that
misleading statements helped improve their position in the match, implying that they
believed that program directors rely on their statements in some way despite their lack of
credibility. Id. at 408 tbl.5. On the other hand, another study reported that over eighty
percent of program directors were skeptical of or did not believe a candidate’s claim that
the program was a highly ranked choice. Peter J. Carek et al., Recruitment Behavior and
Program Directors: How Ethical Are Their Perspectives About the Match Process?, 32 FAM.
MED. 258, 259 (2000).
75. Carek et al., supra note 74, at 259.
76. Id. at 259 tbl.1. When communicating with low-ranked applicants, 6.0% of
program directors said they would respond honestly, 30.1% would give a vague but
positive response, 23.2% would give a vague but negative response, 0.3% would lie, and
40.5% would indicate that they were not permitted to share this information with the
applicant. Id.
77. See Peter J. Carek & Kimberly D. Anderson, Residency Selection Process and
the Match: Does Anyone Believe Anybody?, 285 JAMA 2784, 2784–85 (2001), for a
discussion of ethics within the residency match.
78. On the other hand, it has been asserted that negotiations outside of the match
nonetheless occur. One observer offers the following comments about the match:
Here, we find a selection process riddled with backstage deals, negotiated perks,
and signing bonuses (of $10,000 and up). With residency slots far exceeding the
number of U.S. medical school graduates, programs battle to entice the “best and
the brightest.” . . . Meanwhile, applicants are well aware that program directors
fear “not filling” and therefore play programs off against each other to wrangle
the “best deal.”
Fred Hafferty, Finding Soul in a “Medical Profession of One,” 28 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y &
L. 133, 147 (2003) (book review) (citations omitted).
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negotiations and a threat to go elsewhere. While competition will
tend to keep compensation within a reasonable range—
applicants may avoid programs with histories or promises of poor
compensation packages—applicants do not have the extra
leverage that they would have in a conventional labor market
characterized by unfettered, individualized competition among
both future employers and future employees. Once the match is
officially made, the resident is bound to accept the position at the
offered salary.79
Moreover, academic work focusing specifically on the
question of matching and wages suggests that matching
mechanisms similar in general form to the NRMP may be
associated with lower wages. Ulrich Kamecke demonstrates this
point with a theoretical model and concludes that “the
competition for interns is not sufficient to force wages all the way
up to their competitive level. In equilibrium the interns are in
general worse off than in an ideal decentralized market.”80 The
general intuition underlying this result is that when programs
make their wage offers through the match, the stated wage only
has to be sufficiently high that the candidate will rank that
program more highly than his or her next best choice. In a
competitive market, a candidate’s ability to seek employment
with a competitor pressures the initial hospital to raise its wages,
allowing the candidate to extract more of the surplus created
through the employment relationship. Without this opportunity
to negotiate, the resident’s pay is not as high as it otherwise
would be.81 A recent working paper by Jeremy Bulow and
Jonathan Levin using a different matching model finds that
when programs do not make individualized salary offers, salaries
will be lower than in a competitive equilibrium, particularly for
the most sought-after residents.82 The features of these papers’
models do not conform precisely to those of the residency match,
but the results suggest the effects the residency match may have
on resident compensation. The models are discussed in more
detail in subpart III.C.4 below.

79. In addition, programs may solidify their bargaining position by not negotiating
individually over salaries. Historically, the characteristics of the position (including duties
and compensation) were specified in advance of the match, and were not subject to
negotiation. Roth, supra note 57, at 995–96.
80. Ulrich Kamecke, Wage Formation in a Centralized Matching Market, 39 INT’L
ECON. REV. 33, 34–35 (1998).
81. Id. at 42, 48.
82. Jeremy Bulow & Jonathan Levin, Matching and Price Competition 1–2
(Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 1818, 2003), available at http://www.stanford.
edu/group/SITE/Levin.03.pdf.
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B. The Procompetitive Match
While some have argued that the match is anticompetitive,
83
others have argued that the match is in fact procompetitive.
Advocates of the match, including the NRMP itself, cite as its
chief advantage its beneficial effect on the timing of residency
offers and acceptances.84 Professor Alvin Roth, an expert in the
economics of matching mechanisms who assisted in a relatively
recent redesign of the residency match, has written extensively
about market timing questions.85 His academic work focuses not
on compensation issues, but on the benefits that arise from
channeling competition through a matching mechanism.86
While the residency antitrust suit complaint argues that the
motivation for adopting the match was relief from competition87
induced upward pressure on wages, Roth’s historical account of
the catalyzing pressures focuses on the timing of offers and
acceptances of residency positions.88 He explains that as a result
83. For general descriptions of benefits of a matching system, see Miller & Greaney,
supra note 1, at 915–16, and Creasman, supra note 1, at 1462–63. For a discussion of
potential benefits (and drawbacks) of a formalized matching process in the context of the
judicial clerkship market, see generally Christopher Avery, Christine Jolls, Richard A.
Posner & Alvin E. Roth, The Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks, 68 U. CHI. L. REV.
793 (2001).
84. See NRMP, How the NRMP Process Works, http://www.nrmp.org/about_nrmp/
how.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (“Because it provides a uniform date for decisions
about residency selection for both applicants and programs, the NRMP matches eliminate
the pressure that might otherwise fall upon applicants and programs to make decisions
before all of their options are known.”).
85. Roth was hired in 1995 to redesign the residency matching system and to
evaluate the redesign’s potential effects. See Al Roth’s Game Theory and Experimental
Economics Page, http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html (last updated June 16,
2005) (an excellent resource for information about matching). The main feature of this
redesign was to move from a “program-proposing” algorithm to an “applicant-proposing”
algorithm to address concerns that the algorithm was too favorable to programs and too
susceptible to strategic manipulation. Roth’s study found that the effects of the
subsequently adopted redesign would be small. See Alvin E. Roth & Elliott Peranson, The
Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of
Economic Design, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 748, 748, 754–55, 773 (1999).
86. See Al Roth’s Game Theory and Experimental Economics Page, supra note 85
(listing Roth’s publications).
87. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 84.
88. Roth, supra note 57, at 992–97. Some medical school graduates of the era in
which the match was adopted echo Roth’s account. In response to an article describing the
antitrust issues raised by the match, W. Hardy Hendren writes,
I graduated from medical school in 1952, the year the National Resident
Matching Program was initiated. As a medical student, I spent five months
working on the Match . . . .
The Match was designed to assist medical students in choosing the best
possible internship.
W. Hardy Hendren, Letter to the Editor, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2260, 2260 (2003).
Another physician writes,
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of competition (presumably the same competition over residents
discussed by the plaintiffs in their complaint), the date of
agreements between applicants and programs began to creep
backward.89 Each program wanted to make sure it could obtain
commitments just a bit before competitor programs.90 The effect
of this creep, or “unraveling,” as Roth terms the phenomenon in
91
other work on market transaction timing, was that offers were
made at increasingly early points in medical school students’
education. By 1944, the standard appointment date had become
the beginning of the student’s junior year, two years before the
residency would begin.92
This unraveling was problematic because it meant that both
students and programs made decisions on the basis of
information that they possessed at an early stage in the students’
education. Students who had completed two years of medical
school may not have had much exposure to clinical practice, and
may not have had much inclination about their own career
preferences, which would influence their residency position
choices. Residency programs, meanwhile, would have had limited
student performance data, impeding their ability to target offers
93
to the most qualified or appropriate candidates. Many efforts
were made to coordinate appointment dates voluntarily, but they
failed.94 The unraveling phenomenon and the difficulty of
resolving it are likely familiar to lawyers, judges, and legal
academics, who have experienced both in the market for federal
judicial clerks.95 In the market for residents, the problem was
Physicians of my era (I attended medical school from 1948 to 1952) remember
seeing senior students sleeping in phone booths waiting for a call from their
first-choice hospital but having to respond to the rest of their choices by a
deadline that was only days or hours away—typically, 72 hours.
The Match was initiated in 1952 by my class, led by Hardy Hendren, now
a professor emeritus at Harvard Medical School. The medical students—not the
hospitals—arranged the Match.
James A. Pittman, Jr., Letter to the Editor, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2260, 2260 (2003)
(footnote omitted).
89. Roth, supra note 57, at 993–94.
90. Id. at 993.
91. See Alvin E. Roth & Xiaolin Xing, Jumping the Gun: Imperfections and
Institutions Related to the Timing of Market Transactions, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 992, 994
(1994) (using the term “unraveling”).
92. Roth, supra note 57, at 994.
93. See, e.g., id. at 993 (noting that hospitals “had to appoint interns without
knowing their final grades or class standings”).
94. Id. at 993–97.
95. For a description of the problems associated with early hiring in the clerkship
market, including informational deficiencies, see Avery et al., supra note 83, at 801–04.
Recent efforts by federal appellate judges to mitigate the unraveling problem through a
hiring moratorium and an agreement to hire students no earlier than the fall of their
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ultimately resolved when the AAMC adopted a proposal to refuse
to release transcripts or reference letters before the end of a
student’s junior year.96
Another problem soon arose, however.97 A program
(“Program B”) would make an offer to a candidate, but the
candidate would not immediately accept it because the program
was the candidate’s second choice. The candidate would instead
wait until he heard from his first choice (“Program A”), while
Program B continued to hold open his position. (Meanwhile,
Program A may have been keeping the candidate waiting
because it was holding open an offer for another candidate.) By
holding open its offer in the hope that the candidate would
eventually accept it, Program B may have sacrificed an
opportunity to make an offer to a third candidate, who may have
preferred to join Program B, but who accepted an offer from a
third program out of the fear she would not get another offer. To
avoid losing the opportunity to recruit other candidates,
programs would want to hold open offers for as little time as
possible. In 1949, for example, the AAMC proposed that offers
should be made just after midnight on November 15, and should
be held open at least until noon the same day.98 There was
pressure for offers to be open for even less time.99 This exploding
offer phenomenon, also historically present in the market for
judicial clerks, is problematic because candidates who do not
want to risk losing an offer may be forced to accept it even
though a more desirable position might be offered
subsequently.100 The phenomenon also may lead to early
acceptances that are later withdrawn, causing considerable
disruption for programs that believe they have a commitment
101
satisfactory to all parties.
The match resolved both of these problems while preserving
competition among both programs and students. If all
participants commit to the match, the backwards-creep problem
third year of law school are documented at Summary of the Law Clerk Hiring Plan, http://
www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/lawclerk.nsf/Content/SUMMARY?OpenDocument
(last
visited Oct. 1, 2005). For an article comparing the judicial clerkship and residency
markets, see Annette E. Clark, On Comparing Apples and Oranges: The Judicial Clerk
Selection Process and the Medical Matching Model, 83 GEO. L.J. 1749 (1995).
96. Roth, supra note 57, at 994.
97. See id. at 994–95 (describing the exploding offer problem).
98. Id. at 995.
99. Id.
100. For a discussion of exploding offers within the law clerk market, see Avery et
al., supra note 83, at 816–25.
101. Roth, supra note 57, at 994 (noting hospitals’ frustration when candidates
revoked their acceptances).
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is resolved because participants do not form binding contracts
outside of the match. This means that binding commitments
cannot be made before the spring of medical students’ senior
year. The match resolves the exploding offer problem by using a
mechanism that precludes the existence of such devices. Based
on the parties’ expressed preferences, the matching algorithm
generates a single offer that the future resident is bound to
accept.102 The match thus places bounds on the competitive
process, bounds that almost certainly alter the matches that are
ultimately formed. The important question for participants is
whether the results of this process are preferable to the results of
unfettered competition.
Historical data and information from similar markets, such
as the market for law clerks, suggest that if competition were
completely unconstrained, contracts would almost certainly be
established earlier in students’ educations.103 Earlier in the
competitive process, programs have less information about the
true quality of students. They have limited information about the
students’ abilities and no information about the improvement in
those abilities over the course of the students’ training.
Furthermore, while students may not lack information about
programs, they may have limited information about their own
preferences with respect to these programs, particularly if most
of their experience has been in a classroom rather than clinical
setting. In addition, other changes in students’ lives during their
medical school years may alter their preferences with respect to
program attributes (geography, for example).
The participants’ lack of information means that the
preferences they express at an early stage in the offer process
may not match the underlying “true” preferences they would
have in an environment with more information. If the residency
match were held in the spring of a student’s second year of
medical school, rather than in the spring of the fourth year, the
results would be quite different. As more time passes,
information accumulates, and the correspondence between
expressed preferences and true preferences improves. The later a
match is formed, the more likely its results will maximize
participant satisfaction. All else equal (an important caveat, as
discussed in subpart III.B.4 below), participants in the
competitive process will prefer later decisions to earlier decisions.

102. See supra Part II (describing the match process).
103. See Avery et al., supra note 83, at 805–06 (describing the “backward progression
in the time of hiring federal judicial law clerks”).
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The second way in which the match alters the results
relative to the unconstrained competitive process also involves
information failures. Imagine that competition over residencies,
while otherwise unconstrained, is delayed until the students’
fourth year. At this point, programs are fully aware of student
characteristics, and their own preferences with respect to those
characteristics. Candidates are fully aware of program
characteristics, and their own preferences with respect to those
characteristics. Each participant in the process could thus
generate a complete rank-ordered list of fully-informed
preferences; the higher the ranking, the higher the participant’s
satisfaction from the resulting match. Nonetheless, information
in this market is still less than perfect. In particular, students
are not ordinarily aware of programs’ preferences with respect to
other students, or other students’ preferences with respect to
programs. Programs are not ordinarily aware of students’
preferences with respect to other programs, or other programs’
preferences with respect to students. Participants are therefore
not fully informed about the nature of the market, and more
specifically, the likelihood that any particular offer will be made
or accepted.
Assume, for example, that a student prefers program A to
program B, and program B to program C. If program B makes an
exploding offer, the student may accept only because the student
is not sufficiently familiar with A’s and other students’
preferences to determine whether A will eventually make him or
her an offer. This situation need not occur if a matching
mechanism is in operation. The match allows residents to
indicate their preferences with respect to multiple states of the
world: “I would love to join program A, but if no position is
available at A, then I’d be happy to join program B, and if not B,
then C.” A resident need not accept an offer from program B only
because a deadline looms and the resident lacks information
about the availability of positions at program A. The computer
has access to complete information about all participants’
preferences, allowing it to satisfy them all simultaneously.104 The
match therefore generates different results than the competitive
process would in the absence of a match, not just because
competition occurs later in the students’ education than it
otherwise would, but also because it can make use of all
information available in the market.

104. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text (describing the matching
algorithm).
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The match produces different results from unconstrained
competition by ensuring that participants can act upon more
105
and by precluding strategic
fully-informed preferences,
behavior that takes advantage of information gaps. The match
algorithm is designed to obtain “stable” matches that reflect
participants’ preferences, as expressed in their rank-orderings.106
If a match is stable, no candidate or program will be matched to
an unacceptable partner. The match algorithm necessarily
achieves this result because it considers only matches suggested
by the participants’ rank-order lists; if no acceptable match is
possible, the participant will remain unmatched.107 In addition, if
a match is stable, there can be no scenario in which a program
and a candidate would both prefer to be matched to each other
rather than to the partner assigned to them by the computer. If a
program and candidate did prefer each other to their assigned
matches, they would have an incentive to deviate from the initial
match, destabilizing it. Thus, for a matching program to be
successful, the algorithm used must produce a stable match.
Professor Roth has found that previous NRMP match outcomes
were stable.108
In other words, if the preferences as reflected in the rankorderings are taken as given, none of the participants could
successfully “contract around” the results of the match. A
resident soliciting programs higher on his or her list would find
that none would be interested in accepting the resident, because
they would already be filled with more desirable candidates. A
program soliciting residents higher on its list would find none
that would be interested in joining, because the residents had

105. The presence of a matching mechanism may make candidates’ preferences less
informed in one respect. In a standard market, job candidates may use the existence
and/or timing of a firm offer to gauge a potential employer’s intensity of preference. See
Priest, supra note 26, at 155–56 (discussing timing as an indicator of intensity of
preference). Centralized matching mechanisms prevent this expression of intensity. If a
candidate’s preference for a firm is ordinarily determined in part by the firm’s preference
for a candidate, then a centralized matching mechanism deprives the candidate of
relevant information. But see infra Part III.C.4 (arguing that offer timing is a poor signal
of preference intensity).
106. In his work, Roth defines stability and analyzes the extent of its existence. See,
e.g., Roth, supra note 57, at 998 (“A given outcome x is called unstable if some student or
hospital receives an unacceptable assignment or if there exists a hospital program hi and
student sj who each prefer the other to their assignment at x.”); id. at 1001 (finding the
existence of a stable outcome).
107. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text (describing the matching
algorithm).
108. Roth & Peranson, supra note 85, at 754. For a discussion of stability in simple
matching mechanisms and more complex matching mechanisms such as the NRMP, see
id. at 752–55.
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already been accepted into programs they preferred. If
participants’ preferences were fully informed, accurately stated,
and static, there would be no way to reassign residents to
programs after the match has occurred that would better satisfy
the preferences of some participants, without making others
worse off. Because the competitive process generates initial
matches based on choices made with less than complete
information, the same cannot be said for unconstrained
competition.
The match could be said to be procompetitive because it
facilitates the acquisition of information in order to generate a
result that market participants could not easily improve upon
through mutual agreement. Because match participants’
preferences are related to the output of residency programs,
matching mechanisms will ultimately help maximize this output,
including resident training, patient care, and medical research.109
C. Efficiency in Matching Markets: A Response to Professor
Priest
In a recently published article, Reexamining the Market for
Judicial Clerks and Other Assortative Matching Markets, George
Priest has challenged the theory that matching mechanisms
benefit competition.110 The article provides a comprehensive
analysis of unraveling markets and the effects of offer-timing
restrictions on aggregate welfare.111 Priest offers two core insights
about matching markets and the unraveling phenomenon. First,
he explains that for the concept of unraveling to have coherence,
the point at which a market “begins” must be identifiable.112
Then, by definition, a market unravels when transactions take
place before this time, or more specifically, before some perceived
“optimal market beginning time.”113 But Priest takes issue with
the notion that a market as a whole can have an optimal

109. Avery and his co-authors point out that the quantity of social benefit produced
by the matching system will depend on how the benefit is created. Specifically, if the
benefit produced is simply an additive function of the inputs of match participants, the
match will have no effect on the total quantity of benefit produced. On the other hand, if
the benefit production function is multiplicative, then it is important that better-quality
participants be matched to each other. See Avery et al., supra note 83, at 804.
110. Priest, supra note 26.
111. See generally id. The discussion infra focuses on the paper’s theory of market
unraveling and its implications for the residency market. It thus sacrifices the nuance
and detail of Priest’s re-analysis of the judicial clerk market, and omits mention of the
clerkship-related evidence Priest uses to support his arguments.
112. Id. at 151.
113. Id.
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beginning time.114 He explains that typically, we assume that
market participants search for contracting partners as long as
the marginal benefits of the search exceed its marginal costs.115
Benefits of search include the improved matches made possible
by superior information, while costs include the resources used to
obtain that information. Each market participant makes its own
decision about when to engage in a transaction, based on
perceived costs and benefits. In this setting, it is not clear why
unraveling should have any normative significance.116
Second, Priest argues that the cause of unraveling is
artificially-imposed constraints on the dimensions along which
market participants can compete.117 Many markets might be said
to have natural “beginnings,” yet no unraveling occurs.118 So what
distinguishes these entry-level markets from markets for
clerkships or residencies? Priest points out that for most jobs,
current salaries, future salaries, working conditions, work
stability, and other characteristics vary.119 Employers hoping to
attract more workers, a particular type of worker, or specific
individual workers would adjust these characteristics
accordingly; employers signal their intensity of preference
through the adjustments they make. But the market for federal
judicial clerks is different: job conditions are similar, salaries
fixed.120 Clerkships may vary substantially in terms of prestige,
121
but again this characteristic is fixed, not negotiable. For this
reason, Priest explains, a judge’s offer is by its nature a take-itor-leave-it offer.122 The only dimension along which judges can

114. See id. at 149–53 (“As a general matter, the concept of an optimal beginning
date of a market is an artifact . . . .”).
115. Id. at 151.
116. Id. at 151–52.
117. Id. at 153–56. Note, however, that an assertion that fixed compensation (or
other terms) is necessary for markets to unravel is inconsistent with economic work that
has examined equilibria in early contracting markets. Wing Suen considers a market in
which the quality of firms is known, the quality of workers is initially unknown but later
revealed, and workers are risk averse—not an unreasonable description of the residency
market. He shows that early contracting may occur despite prices that reflect supply and
demand. See Wing Suen, A Competitive Theory of Equilibrium and Disequilibrium
Unravelling in Two-Sided Matching, 31 RAND J. ECON. 101, 101–05 (2000).
118. To illustrate, Priest cites Roth’s work finding little unraveling in entry-level
markets for MBA recipients, despite the fact that they return to full-time work
simultaneously after completing their degrees. Priest, supra note 26, at 153.
119. Id. at 153–54.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 154–55 (observing that “some judges stand out as ‘feeders’ to the Supreme
Court,” but noting that the reputation and ability of a judge are fixed at the time of
application).
122. Id. at 155.
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compete is the timing of their offers.123 Judges signal the intensity
of their preferences by making an offer before others make theirs,
and thus “the timing of the offer becomes the currency” that
124
clears the market.
Together, these arguments give reason to doubt that a
computerized matching algorithm is advisable as a mechanism
for equilibrating a market. First, unraveling is not necessarily
problematic, as it results from individual decisions about the
costs and benefits of further search, and there is no reason to
presume that more opportunity to search is better. Applying this
idea to the residency market, the notion that it is optimal for the
residency match to occur during a student’s fourth year in
medical school has no obvious economic basis. If individual
programs and students jointly decide to form a match during the
students’ third year, it is only because their benefits from doing
so exceed their costs. Why should they be required to wait for the
match? Second, any early offers in the residency market are
caused by constraints on other negotiation dimensions. To the
extent that programs refuse to negotiate concerning their
characteristics, there is no guarantee that the market will
equilibrate; timing of offers therefore becomes a basis for
allocating residency positions. A prospective resident who wants
an attractive position must take it early or risk its
disappearance.
While Priest’s article focuses on the market for judicial
clerks, Priest discusses the market for residencies as an example
125
He presents Roth’s
of a market subject to unraveling.
description of the early-offer and exploding-offer problems as

123. Id. (explaining that the judge cannot adjust a clerk’s salary, change the job
description, or alter working conditions, but the judge can control the timing of the
clerkship offer).
124. Id. at 156. See also id. at 153–56, for the full version of the argument outlined
here; and id. at 182–99, for a broader presentation of the argument and an application to
a variety of markets in which unraveling has been alleged to occur. In this section of his
article, Priest argues that
there are two separate phenomena to which Professor Roth’s work has alerted us
that explain virtually all of his examples of true unraveling. One is a market
phenomenon; the second, a regulatory phenomenon. They are related because
they both involve constraints in some form on the operation of market forces.
The first and, I believe the most interesting, phenomena in the Roth
examples are markets in which time-of-offer is employed as a currency in the
market transactions themselves. . . .
The
second
phenomenon . . . derives
from
market
regulation. . . . [Specifically, it derives from efforts to evade regulations that]
constrain transactions to some “optimal” time.
Id. at 183–84.
125. Id. at 187–90.
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they existed in the 1940s, notes the adoption of the match as a
solution, and shows that in 2001, the range of compensation paid
to medical school graduates was much smaller than the range for
law school graduates.126 He concludes that this difference
suggests an explanation for why time-of-offer becomes important
for medical school graduates, but not for law school graduates.127
Modern salary information is perhaps not the best source of
evidence for a theory linking constrained terms to early offers,
however. While the salary information might indicate a
constraint on terms, there is no evidence of early-offer
competition in the modern era, simply because the match would
preclude it. However, it is possible that salaries were as
compressed in the 1940s as today, and that it was this
compression that led to the spate of early offers that could be
eliminated only by the match. (Note that a finding that salaries
were as compressed in the 1940s as they are today would tend to
refute the plaintiffs’ arguments that the match itself has caused
salary compression. Instead, any compression would have
resulted from some other type of constraint present both in the
1940s and today.)
Regardless of whether recent residency stipends offer
support for Priest’s theory, Priest’s general insights on matching
markets could apply to the residency market. Priest’s paper
concludes that restrictions on the terms of trade (such as salary)
lead to the use of time-of-offer to clear markets, that the use of
time-of-offer as a market-clearing mechanism rewards those who
can recognize talent on the basis of limited information, and
finally that the “introduction of restrictions on the time-of-offer
currency, like any other restriction on terms of trade, will change
the allocative outcomes of the market . . . but can generally be
predicted to reduce aggregate welfare.”128 In the context of the
residency market, this logic would suggest that constraints on
negotiations over residency benefits lead to unraveling, that
unraveling rewards those who make the best use of information
available early in the process, and that the introduction of the
timing restrictions inherent in the match changes the programresident matching process and outcomes in such a way that
aggregate welfare is reduced.
It is important to evaluate Priest’s analysis because it
implies that there is reason to doubt the procompetitive benefits
touted by match advocates. While match supporters typically
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 203–04.
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claim that matching mechanisms are efficient because they
reduce mismatches, Priest argues that an efficiency analysis
focusing on mismatches is incomplete in three ways.129 First,
unraveling is not properly characterized as a prisoner’s dilemma;
it is not the case that everyone gains through a coordinated
matching mechanism.130 Second, it is important to take into
account the costs and benefits of information acquisition; given
the costs of information gathering, it is not necessarily the case
that more is better.131 Finally, the finding of match-related
welfare improvement is based on ordinal matches, and ordinal
matches do not take into account differences in intensity of
preferences that would ordinarily be reflected in differences in
132
the terms of trade. Each of these three arguments offers an
important insight, but as the below analysis demonstrates, none
necessarily leads to the conclusion that the residency match
impedes efficiency.
1. Does the Match Solve a Prisoner’s Dilemma? Roth has
characterized the early-competition problem as a prisoner’s
133
In the classic prisoner’s dilemma, the prisoners’
dilemma.
payoffs are structured such that making individually rational
decisions (to confess) will generate a poor equilibrium outcome
for both prisoners.134 Coordination (through an agreement not to
confess) will generate improved outcomes for each relative to the
135
poor equilibrium outcome. If the relevant benchmark is the
benefit to the prisoners, coordination generates a more efficient
result than decentralized rational decisionmaking: each is better
off. If early competition is structured as a prisoner’s dilemma, in
which all programs and students are made better off by delaying
decisionmaking, then mechanisms that delay decisionmaking
will increase aggregate welfare. If the match solves a prisoner’s
dilemma, then it necessarily improves the welfare of match
participants.
In Priest’s view, however, the prisoner’s dilemma label is
inappropriate because some participants may not become better
off through coordination.136 Because the judges that make the

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
1992).
135.
136.

Id. at 159–61. This Article considers Priest’s arguments in reverse order.
Id. at 161.
Id. at 159–61.
Id. at 159.
Roth, supra note 57, at 992.
THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 344 (David W. Pearce ed., 4th ed.
See id.
Priest, supra note 26, at 161.

(4) MADISONG1

788

10/10/2005 2:52 PM

HOUSTON LAW REVIEW

[42:3

earliest offers benefit from the unraveling and would lose from
coordination, the game that judges play cannot properly be
characterized as a prisoner’s dilemma. If some participants gain
from coordination while others lose, then the only way to assess
whether a matching mechanism has improved welfare is to find
some way to measure the aggregate welfare of all involved,
trading off one judge’s gain against another’s loss. The aggregate
efficiency improvement from the forced delay is no longer so
clear.137
This assessment can be made more complete by
differentiating between the two effects of matching mechanisms.
One effect is to delay all decisions. Because more information
about quality and preferences is available later, all else equal,
the majority of market participants will prefer to delay their
decisions. So, for example, most students and programs would
likely prefer to schedule the NRMP in students’ fourth year in
medical school, as it is now scheduled, to scheduling the NRMP
in students’ second year in medical school. In this sense,
coordination that delays the formation of matches does make
everyone better off. The judge that makes the first offer in
January of an unraveling market would prefer to make the first
offer in June; the judge that makes the second offer would rather
make that offer in July than in February.
But the second effect of a matching mechanism, relative to
an uncoordinated market, is to alter the way in which matches
are formed. While an early-offer judge may rather make an offer
in June than in January, that judge may not want to participate
in such a system if it also means that the judge can no longer
make the first offer. An early-offer judge takes strategic
advantage of the fact that participants are uncertain about the
likelihood of other matches to improve the judge’s payoff from the
match. A matching mechanism forces the judge to sacrifice the
strategic advantage associated with moving early, and this loss
may exceed the gain from delaying the choice process. As a
result, the early-offer judge may not prefer the matching
mechanism outcome. Priest is thus correct to note that
coordination does not necessarily benefit all participants.138
137. For this reason, Avery and his co-authors note that the concept of Pareto
efficiency (which exists when “there is no way to make one or more parties better off
without making at least one person worse off”) is not particularly useful in evaluating the
functioning of the judicial clerk market. Avery et al., supra note 83, at 800. They suggest
as a potential alternative method examining the “‘sum total of satisfaction’” of clerks and
judges. See id. at 800–04.
138. Priest, supra note 26, at 161 (finding that coordination does not benefit all; for
example, less-favored judges or applicants might benefit from the early-offer market).

(4) MADISONG1

2005]

10/10/2005 2:52 PM

THE RESIDENCY MATCH

789

The degree to which this observation distinguishes the
clerkship setting (or residency setting) from the prisoner’s
dilemma setting turns on the characterization of the
counterfactual. It is true that individual judges prefer the result
where they make offers before other judges to the result where
139
all judges make offers at the same time. But it is also true that
prisoners prefer the result where they confess and their
counterparts do not to the result of the coordinated game in
which neither confesses.140 In the simple version of the prisoner’s
dilemma, however, the outcome where one prisoner confesses and
the other does not is not an equilibrium outcome. Because each
prisoner would like to be the confessing one, the result is that
both will confess, unless they both agree not to. It is for this
reason that coordination improves the welfare of both. The
reason that coordination does not benefit all judges is that the
counterfactual is in effect a dis-equilibrium outcome, one in
which one of the judges moves first. Each judge would like to
move first, but the judges’ choices are not dichotomous. The game
is not one in which a judge can choose to be “first” or “last” in the
same way that a prisoner can choose to “confess” or “not confess”;
instead, the judge must choose an offer time along a continuous
timeline. The result is likely that rather than all of the judges
making offers “first,” as in the prisoner’s dilemma—the worst
possible outcome in that the judges both sacrifice information
and fail to gain an advantage over competitors—the judges’ offers
spread out along the timeline. The strategy that produces this
spread resembles the one involved in the prisoner’s dilemma,
even if the outcome does not. A second result of this game is
unraveling, which occurs when offer dates creep backward as
judges annually update their predictions about when they must
move in order to move first.
If the spread along the timeline were a product only of an
annual guessing game, then the distribution of gains and losses
associated with relative offer timing would be more a matter of
chance than of choice. Judges would expect to gain little from the
operation of such a mechanism, and lose much, due to the
decreasing availability of information as timing creeps backward.
They, like the confessing prisoners, would have reason to
advocate for the adoption of a coordinated mechanism.

139. See id. (noting that judges who extend early offers maximize their individual
interests, and are better off as a consequence).
140. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 134, at 344 (“The
incentive here, for the rational [prisoner], concerned only with his own survival, is to
confess and let the others suffer the consequences.”).
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Judges’ relative positions along the timeline may be
determined by more than just chance, however. As Priest
recognizes, judges’ preferences over offer timing depend on a
141
variety of factors. Potential factors that might influence offer
timing include the judge’s ability to predict the quality of
candidates and the judge’s disutility from selecting poor
candidates. A judge particularly talented at selecting candidates
based on little information, for example, will be more likely to
make offers that fall on the early-offer end of the timeline.
Because this judge need not benefit from a coordinated matching
mechanism, competition among judges (or residency programs)
does not necessarily take the form of a prisoner’s dilemma. That
some judges benefit disproportionately from early-offer
competition, however, does not mean that such competition is
efficiency-enhancing relative to competition within a matching
system. The losses to other judges may equal or exceed the gains
to these judges. The only way to evaluate the efficiency question
is to investigate more carefully the nature of the early-offer
competition.
2. Do Early Offers Obtain Distributive or Productive Gains?
After rejecting the prisoner’s dilemma analogy, Priest turns to a
different analogy, one comparing a judge to a prospector who
buys mineral-rich land.142 The availability of an early-offer
strategy encourages “judges to invest in techniques of prediction”
to improve their matches, just as the possibility of profits
encourages potential buyers to invest in the development of
“specialized knowledge . . . to acquire a valuable object in
advance of the revelation of its value to the wider set of market
participants.”143 If we believe that markets are generally efficient,
and that the market for land containing minerals is typical of
efficient markets, then the implication of this analogy is that
perhaps markets characterized by early offers are efficient too.
But there are important differences between unraveling markets
and markets for real estate that suggest that this analogy is
problematic.
Unraveling markets are often characterized by the existence
of some date before which the transaction—trade of a commodity,
141. See, e.g., Priest, supra note 26, at 161, 163 (suggesting that less-favored judges
and less prominent judges may be willing to make early offers); id. at 151 (explaining that
market timing will be determined in part by search costs, including “the value of time, the
costs of obtaining information” and “the level of risk aversion deriving from expected
uncertainty”).
142. Id. at 162.
143. Id.
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provision of a service, formation of a relationship—cannot
begin.144 In the case of residencies, this date is naturally
determined by the completion of students’ medical school
education. Full-time residencies that build on students’ full-time
medical school training cannot possibly begin before medical
school is complete.145 As a result, the benefit produced by the
match cannot be realized until the residency actually begins.
Market efficiency is a function of this benefit. It is true that a
market for mineral-rich real estate rewards the first person to
146
recognize its value, and that this reward helps to achieve
market efficiency. But in this sort of market, the benefit starts
accruing immediately after the “match” is made. From an
efficiency perspective, it is better to identify the value of land
earlier rather than later, because the owner can immediately
extract the minerals, or inform the world of their presence and
resell the land to someone who can. The more quickly
information is discovered, the more quickly prices adjust, and the
more quickly resources can be allocated to their most efficient
use. Markets for law clerks and residents do not share this
characteristic. Whether the match is made two years prior to the
beginning of the position (on the basis of predictive powers) or
one year prior to the beginning of the position (on the basis of
transcript information), no benefit can accrue until the training
actually begins. There is no efficiency justification for rewarding
first movers solely because they are first.147
This distinction has been captured in analysis of the contract
law doctrine of unilateral mistake. Robert Cooter and Thomas
Ulen argue, for example, that when information is “productive”
and acquired by investment, a mistake defense based on the
failure to acquire this information should be rejected and the
148
They cite “information that farmland
contract enforced.
contains valuable mineral resources” as an example of productive
information, and note that “[e]fficiency demands giving people
strong incentives to discover productive facts.”149 Those who
144. See id. at 151 (noting that many of the markets studied by Professor Roth “can
be defined as ‘beginning’ at particular moments”).
145. See id. (observing that “entry-level employment markets can be defined as
‘beginning’ only after the moment of graduation from a high school, college, or
professional school”).
146. See id. at 162 (noting that early investors are rewarded).
147. If the timing of offers and acceptances is highly correlated with the strength of
market participants’ partner preferences, and early offers produce matches that would
not otherwise be formed, then there may be an efficiency benefit from early-offer
competition. This possibility is discussed (and discounted) in subpart III.C.4 infra.
148. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 282–83 (4th ed. 2004).
149. Id. at 281–82.
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invest in discovery of minerals should be allowed to profit from
their investments; those who do not invest should not be
permitted to profit from the discoveries of those who do.
But Cooter and Ulen also identify a category of
“redistributive information,” which “creates a bargaining
advantage that can be used to redistribute wealth in favor of the
informed party.”150 A judge who expends resources in assessing
candidate quality for the sole purpose of determining whether to
make an early offer (i.e., to redistribute wealth from a later judge
to him or herself) is investing in redistributive information.
Cooter and Ulen point out that investment in redistributive
information is wasteful, and further explain that it “induces
defensive expenditures by people trying not to lose their wealth
to better-informed people.”151 If one judge invests in making the
predictions that are necessary for early offers, other judges must
make similar investments so that they too can make early offers
and thus avoid a loss of wealth to the first-mover judge.
It might be argued that investments in assessing quality are
productive, as well as redistributive, because they allow higherquality matches to be formed. From this perspective, investment
should be encouraged. However, the information that is produced
in an unraveling market is produced quite inefficiently. A
program that must predict the quality of a resident two years
into medical school must invest substantially more resources in
that prediction than a program that predicts the quality of a
resident two years later, because it must develop predictive
models based on information that may be only indirectly
connected with future performance.152 In contrast, a program
making a later prediction can acquire more directly applicable
information cheaply, because it is produced nearly without cost
as a byproduct of the educational process (in the form of grades,
for example). Because investment costs are likely a declining
function of time, all else equal, a matching process that occurs
later will be more efficient than a process that occurs earlier.153
150. Id. at 282.
151. Id.
152. Cf. Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, The Market for Elite Law Firm Associates,
31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 909, 936 (2004) (arguing that “[b]ecause law firms hire when
candidates have so little tangible, relevant information to provide, firms must spend more
time in interviews to gather information”). Ginsburg and Wolf analyze the market for law
firm associates, including its unraveling tendencies and the potential explanations for the
failure to implement a centralized matching mechanism. See id. at 936–63.
153. The arguments about information presume that the information will be useful.
One study has concluded that medical school grades and exam performance did not
predict residency clinical performance. Stephen M. Borowitz, et al., Information Collected
During the Residency Match Process Does Not Predict Clinical Performance, 154
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Given that the time at which a specific piece of information is
produced or collected has no bearing on its usefulness in
assessing match quality, the main reason to make a costly
investment in predictions rather than waiting for information to
be revealed is to redistribute wealth from competing judges to
oneself.
The idea that investment in acquiring soon-to-be naturally
revealed information should be discouraged has also been
explored in the context of contract law. Melvin Eisenberg argues
that gains from acquiring “foreknowledge,” defined as
“knowledge that ‘will, in due time, be evident to all,’” are often
redistributive, and that the cost of acquiring such knowledge
exceeds its social value.154 He concludes that the law should not
provide incentives for acquiring foreknowledge.155 When a judge
(or residency program) tries to predict qualities that will be
naturally revealed as a candidate acquires more experience
inside or outside of the classroom, the judge (or program) invests
in foreknowledge. The acquisition of such information is likely
inefficient, and the match eliminates this inefficiency by
eliminating the reward for it (the pairing that would result from
the early offer).
Priest acknowledges that the distributional gains associated
with being the first to capture a limited resource may provide an
incentive for socially excessive investment, but argues that this
156
concern does not apply in the clerkship or resident contexts. He
explains that socially excessive investment arises when the
resource’s value remains constant over time, but “the value of the
resource to the judge”—presumably, the value of the clerk—
157
changes over time.
As explained previously, however, the
benefit to the judge (or residency program) of matching with a
particular candidate is not a function of the timing of match
formation; it is purely a function of the productivity of the

ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 256, 256 (2000). While these results do cast
some doubt on match supporters’ arguments, they do not undermine them. First, the
study finds a correlation between performance and having been ranked in the top ten of
the match list. Id. Second, the study is limited to sixty-nine residents in a single residency
program, and may not be representative of the experience elsewhere. Id. Third, programs’
preferences (and hence rankings) may take into account factors other than clinical
performance. Finally, even if programs cannot effectively make use of the additional
information gained through a later match process, students may.
154. Melvin A. Eisenberg, Disclosure in Contract Law, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1645, 1664–65
(2003) (quoting Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the
Reward to Inventive Activity, 61 AM. ECON. REV. 561, 562 (1971)).
155. Id. at 1665.
156. Priest, supra note 26, at 160.
157. Id.
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relationship once the relationship begins. Judges make early
offers not to ensure that a given clerk or group of clerks will
produce more than they otherwise would, but to ensure that the
benefit of the clerk’s fixed productivity accrues to them—a
distributional gain, rather than a productive one.158
While the benefit associated with hiring any given clerk or
resident does not change over time, the cost of hiring the clerk
may. But given that additional information about prospective
clerks is naturally revealed as time progresses, the costs
associated with hiring may actually decrease over time,
suggesting that it is more efficient to hire clerks later than
159
earlier. In fact, the declining-cost nature of information in the
market for clerks or residents is another factor that distinguishes
these markets from the market for mineral-rich land. In the
market for mineral rights, the cost of information acquisition
may decrease over time because technology improves or because
someone may eventually stumble across a tell-tale sign of the
presence of minerals. But for the most part, there is no reason to
believe that there is a particular advantage to waiting a few
years to investigate the quality of land.
In his analysis of timing decisions, Priest emphasizes a
different type of cost, the cost of “foregoing the opportunity of
securing the clerk because of intervening rival offers.”160 From an
individual market participant’s perspective, the cost of foregone
opportunities is indeed a very real cost of delay, one that plays an

158. If the value of a given clerk does not change across time, is there anything else
that does? Priest points to two possible considerations: the costs of the search process,
which are discussed in the next paragraph and in subpart III.C.4, and “those costs
associated with the effect of the passage of time on the expected value of those applicants
remaining in the market.” Id. If early-offer judges correctly select the most productive
candidates, they leave a less-productive pool of candidates behind. This is one of the
“costs” associated with waiting to make an offer. But this cost is no different from that
faced by a real estate investor who fails to identify a valuable property before a competing
investor purchases it; the investor then is left with only less valuable properties to
purchase. This cost stems from the limited availability of the resource in question (the
most valuable properties), and is the same cost that generates socially inefficient
overinvestment. The declining-quality phenomenon does not make early offers socially
productive; on the contrary, it is the basis for the distributive gain that provides the
incentive for early offers.
159. It is true, as Priest argues, that it is not always beneficial to acquire more
information; it may be desirable, for example, to make an offer before all interviews are
complete. Id. at 166 (arguing that canceling an interview or extending an early offer in an
effort to minimize costs is not inefficient). For instance, if an interview costs $100, and the
second applicant is at most $50 better or worse than the first applicant, it is more efficient
to make an offer to either candidate immediately than to interview the second one. But
when information can be obtained at almost no economic cost purely through delay, an
efficient system would facilitate delay.
160. Id. at 157.
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important role in the participant’s cost-benefit analysis of when
to make or to accept an offer.161 A rational participant would
certainly take this cost into account. These opportunity costs
differ from those of information acquisition, however, because
they do not necessarily represent real economic costs to society.162
They do not involve the consumption of resources, and so would
not be part of an assessment of the overall economic efficiency of
the matching process. Their only impact on efficiency would be
through an indirect route; they affect the nature of the offers and
acceptances that are made, thereby affecting the quality of the
resulting matches. The scarcity of information that exists when
early offers are made gives reason to doubt that these offers
would generate a superior match.
3. Does Inefficiency Arise from Ordinal Ranking in the
Match? Priest’s third argument, however, does suggest a way in
which early-offer competition might generate a superior result to
the residency match. He argues that it is inappropriate to infer
efficiency based on ordinal, rather than cardinal, expressions of
preferences.163 By relying entirely on ordinal rankings of
preferences, the residency match may achieve inefficient
164
results. Participants in the medical residency match indicate
their first and second choices, but do not disclose how much more
they value their first choice than their second.165 Nor is there any
basis for determining the extent to which one program’s
preference for its top-ranked candidate exceeds a second
program’s preference for its top-ranked candidate.166
Imagine the following scenario: Program A would generate
$6 in surplus from candidate Y, and $4 from candidate Z.
Program B would generate $5 from a match with Y, and $1 from
a match with Z. Both programs would therefore rank Y first and
Z second. Imagine that both candidates would generate $2 in
surplus if matched with A, and $1 if matched with B; both would
therefore rank program A first and B second. Assume further
161. See id. (noting that the value of delaying an offer to a “candidate may well be
less than the cost incurred by delaying the offer”).
162. Priest implicitly acknowledges this point later in the article, when he argues
that those who fail to get their preferred match because of early offers “may claim that a
‘cost’ has been imposed upon them, but it is not a cost that in a competitive economy
commands normative significance.” Id. at 162.
163. See id. at 159 (noting that the residency match relies on ordinal rankings that
fail to account for differences in intensity of preferences); id. at 174 (arguing that “ordinal
maximization does not guarantee the maximization of aggregate preferences”).
164. Id. at 174.
165. See supra notes 46–53 and accompanying text (describing the match algorithm).
166. Priest, supra note 26, at 159.
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that there is no way for any match participant to reallocate a
portion of its surplus to another. If each program had one
residency position available, the residency match algorithm
would assign candidate Y to program A, and candidate Z to
program B, generating $10 in total surplus ($6 for A, $2 for Y, $1
for B, $1 for Z). But this is not the maximum surplus possible. If
the program had assigned Z to program A and Y to program B,
$12 would have been created ($4 for A, $1 for Y, $5 for B, $2 for
Z). Note that this result does not contradict the earlier
observation that the residency match algorithm produces a stable
match. Because program A would be uninterested in forming a
match with Z (given that it has Y), and Y would be uninterested
in forming a match with B (given that it has A), any effort to
rearrange the results of the match under the given assumptions
would be unsuccessful. And yet, all of the participants would be
collectively better off—the match result would be more efficient—
if the match had worked the other way around.
One way to alter this result is to permit the reallocation of
surplus through a Coasian side deal.167 So, for example, if
program B sweetened the surplus its residents would get by
offering a $3 bonus, Y would have ranked program B first, and
the algorithm would have assigned Z to A and Y to B and
generated the $12 surplus ($4 for A, $4 for Y, $2 for B, $2 for Z).
Alternatively, after the match has been made, B would be willing
to pay A and Y to switch partners. Paying A $2.25 and Y $1.25,
for example, would improve B’s welfare by 50 cents, Z’s welfare
by $1, and the welfare of both A and Y by 25 cents each, resulting
in an aggregate gain of $2. If the match generates inefficient
results, the parties have an incentive to renegotiate. But if the
match is based strictly on ordinal rankings, the only way this
match reallocation can occur is if the parties are allowed to
express their preferences through payments of bonuses or bribes.
To the extent that Priest is correct in asserting that one
characteristic of markets with a tendency to unravel is

167. SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 62, at 379. The Coase theorem suggests
that “[w]here property rights are well defined and transaction costs are low, the affected
parties can get together and negotiate an efficient solution.” Id.
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inflexibility in the terms of trade (a questionable assertion),168
then this efficiency-enhancing reassignment cannot occur.169
Thus, the degree of inefficiency arising from an ordinal
match depends both on the initial preferences of the participants
and the extent to which reallocation of surplus is possible. If
programs are all of the same quality, and students are all of the
same quality, and the participants’ benefits from the match
depend only on quality, then any assigned pairing would be
efficient. (But of course, in this case there would be no need for a
match in the first place.) This is an unlikely description of the
conditions surrounding the residency match. Still unlikely, but
less so, is that programs differ in quality, and candidates differ in
quality, but a given program produces the same benefit for all
candidates, and a given candidate produces the same benefit for
all programs. If the numbers of the above example were altered
to reflect preferences based on these assumptions, the match
algorithm should generate the efficient result without any need
for reallocation of surplus. In order for the ordinal preferencebased rankings to be problematic in the above example, there

168. While constraints on terms of trade may contribute to unraveling, they may not
be a precondition of unraveling. See supra note 117. Constraints on terms will almost
certainly affect market equilibria. If compensation is artificially constrained, for example,
it will not reflect the scarcity of positions (or of candidates) with desirable attributes.
Participants cannot make up for deficiencies in their attributes by offering a higher wage
or accepting a lower one. But even if compensation is unconstrained, it may not lead to
equilibrium in markets characterized by scarcity, incomplete information, and an
inability to renegotiate. From a residency program’s perspective, for example, only a few
candidates have completed the educational prerequisites necessary to fill a position, and
only a subset of this group is likely to have the attributes the program seeks. If program A
could lure away a candidate at any time from program B by offering better terms, and if
transaction costs barred program B from seeking compensatory damages for the
candidate’s departure, there would be little gain to program B from making an early
match. The unraveling problem arises when that initial match is binding and decisions
are made without full information about others’ preferences; these characteristics help to
create the strategic incentives to move early. Even if a candidate can negotiate terms with
the first program that makes her an offer, the program has an incentive to make an offer
early so that she cannot be enticed away by a better offer later. It is the constraints on
renegotiation, then, that contribute to the unraveling problem. The plaintiffs in the
NRMP suit alleged that program rules restrict movement from one program to another.
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 88(b). Restrictions need not be artificial in nature, however, to
result in unraveling. The costs associated with changing positions, such as moving costs
or the costs of gaining familiarity with a new environment, may be enough to impede later
movement. The higher these transactions costs, the more likely unraveling is to occur.
169. In general, from an efficiency standpoint it is important that mismatches,
whether due to misinformation, changing preferences, or other factors, be corrected. Rules
that impede movement from one residency to another, either outright or by raising the
costs of movement, may therefore contribute to inefficiency. The plaintiffs in the NRMP
suit alleged that “the ACGME imposes substantial obstacles to the ability of a resident
physician to transfer employment from one employer to another during the period of
residency.” Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 88(b).
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must be a difference in the relative valuations programs assign
the candidates, or in the relative valuations candidates assign
the programs. In the above example, it is because program B’s
degree of preference of Y to Z is stronger than program A’s degree
of preference of Y to Z that it is more efficient for Y to join
program B.
In the presence of initial preferences such as those in the
above example, reallocation of surplus among the participating
parties is necessary to achieve the efficient result. The example
was posed in terms of an initial allocation of surplus, and then
reallocation in the form of a bonus. In the real world, however,
students do not think in terms of surpluses and bonuses, but in
terms of program attributes and compensation. Students’
preferences for a program are a function of the quality of the
training and educational opportunities the program provides, as
well as the program’s geographical location, culture, and
prestige.170 Their preferences will also be a function of the
171
program’s immediate monetary benefits, including its stipend.
Programs’ preferences for students will be based on the benefits
the programs anticipate the students will generate, whether
these benefits take the form of providing valuable patient care
services, assisting in research, or enhancing the teaching
physicians’ work environment. The ability of programs to recruit
successfully the students they most prefer depends on the degree
to which they can influence these students’ choices. One way to
influence these choices is to increase the students’ calculations of
expected “surplus” by increasing stipends. So, for example, the $3
bonus that B offered might in reality take the form of a higher
stipend. This higher compensation will increase the prospective
residents’ anticipated surplus, which in turn will increase their
ranking of the program, which in turn will affect the match that
is assigned, thereby affecting the total surplus generated by the
170. Cf. David A. Thomas, The Law School Rankings Are Harmful Deceptions: A
Response to Those Who Praise the Rankings and Suggestions for a Better Approach to
Evaluating Law Schools, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 419, 432–33 (2003) (listing location, prestige,
rankings, financial incentives, and quality of education as some of the reasons prospective
law students prefer certain schools over others).
171. The relative influence of training and monetary compensation on prospective
residents’ choices is an empirical question. Quality of training has certainly long been an
important criterion. Positions in teaching hospitals (hospitals with a medical-school
affiliation) were much more sought after than those in regular community hospitals, both
before and after World War II. LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 93, 185. Ludmerer also states
that community “hospitals often offered financial inducements to prospective interns, but
usually to no avail, since students would choose internships on the basis of perceived
educational benefits, not on the size of the stipend.” Id. at 95. This statement lends
support to the observation that residents value education and training highly, perhaps
even more highly than hospitals value resident services.
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final match.172 The higher stipend obviates any need for
subsequent reallocation.
The implication of this analysis is that the initial example
that generated the inefficient matching might never arise in the
first place. It does not describe a market equilibrium. Programs
will compete for the most productive candidates by adjusting the
compensation that they offer. As long as programs are permitted
to set their compensation, the nature of the competitive process
will generate surpluses for the candidates such that the ordinal
nature of the rankings will not ultimately substantially impede
173
the efficiency of the match.
In a model of the matching process, Bulow and Levin have
indeed shown that if programs are able to make personalized
offers of compensation, a stable assignment of candidates to
programs will achieve an efficient result.174 While commentators
have implied that there is some individual negotiation over
175
residency terms,
Bulow and Levin acknowledge that
personalized offers are unusual.176 Instead, programs tend to offer
a single compensation level to all potential residents. This means
that the match outcome may not be completely efficient. Bulow
and Levin’s results suggest that in a market in which programs
make offers that do not individually vary, there will be some
inefficiency, but that the nature of the competition that occurs
limits the magnitude of inefficiency.177 Ultimately, the level of
efficiency that an ordinal match will achieve depends on the
structure of the participants’ underlying preferences and the
nature of the competitive process that determines the salaries
172. Sanders Chae notes that programs may refuse to increase their salaries
“because they cannot be guaranteed that the students whom they really want (and whom
they believe are worth a higher price) will be matched with them.” Chae, supra note 1, at
353. It is true that program B may be nervous about increasing its salary offer by $3; if
student Y does not rank them first, they will end up being matched to student Z at a loss
of $3 rather than a gain of $2. But the point of the compensation increase is to solicit Y’s
top ranking, and under the assumptions, a rational Y will rank program B first. Program
B will be guaranteed to get the students it wants, if it has sufficient knowledge of the
preferences of the participants in the matching process, and if it has enough money to
offer them. See Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, for a more thorough model of matching
mechanisms that takes into account the problems posed by making uniform offers to all
potential residents.
173. See generally Bulow & Levin, supra note 82 (analyzing competitive equilibria in
matching markets). Bulow and Levin model the types of strategies hospitals are likely to
use in setting compensation in response to competitive pressure from other hospitals. Id.
174. Id. at 26–27.
175. See supra note 78.
176. Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, at 27 (“[P]articipants in the residency match
report that personalized contingent offers are quite uncommon.”).
177. See id. at 3, 19–22 (explaining and demonstrating that the inefficiency is
minimal due to the local nature of the competition among “similar opponents”).
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offered.178 In the context that Priest considers, the federal judicial
clerk matching process, salaries are set by the federal
government and do not necessarily reflect the workings of a
179
competitive process.
This makes it much more difficult to
obtain the differentiation necessary to generate an efficient
match, regardless of whether there is a formal ordinal matching
process. To the extent compensation in residency programs is
permitted to vary, it is more likely that the residency match will
generate efficient results.
4. Summary: Factors in an Efficiency Assessment of the
Match. Ultimately, an efficiency analysis of the residency match
must include a comparison of the aggregate benefits for all
participants in a market characterized by early-offer competition
(unraveling) to a market characterized by a formal matching
mechanism. For an individual participant, the most important
determinant of benefit is likely the quality of the partnership
produced. The quality of the partnership produced in each setting
will depend on the nature of competition in each setting.
Priest argues that when negotiation over terms is
constrained, the timing of offers becomes the mechanism used to
express the preferences of market participants: “In the context of
the clerkship market where . . . price signals are suppressed,
time-of-offer serves as a market-clearing mechanism to allow
judges with higher intensities of preference for clerks to bid them
180
away from judges whose intensities of preference are lower.”
This description is reasonable in an unraveling market where the
initial match is binding.181 The stronger the preference of a
participant for a particular partner relative to other potential

178. This conclusion is evident from Bulow and Levin’s careful theoretical evaluation
of the efficiency properties of matches. In analyses not described here, they investigate
the effects of a variety of assumptions. See id. for more details.
179. Priest, supra note 26, at 154–55. In Priest’s view, it is this rigidity of terms that
generates the unraveling phenomenon. See id. at 155–58.
180. Id. at 174.
181. If the initial match were not binding, and if formation of a new match were
costless, then unraveling would not occur. There would be no benefit to forming an early
match because a partner offered a preferable match later would simply abandon the early
one. This process would ensure an efficient result. Any barriers to movement, however,
would impede this efficient result. This is one justification for the Department of Justice’s
challenge to residency program “guidelines” that limited the ability of programs to recruit
residents away from other programs. See Complaint ¶ 16, United States v. Ass’n of
Family Practice Residency Dirs., No. 96-575-CV-W-2 (W.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 1996), available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f0700/0774.pdf (“The Guidelines embody an agreement
among the member family practice residency program directors to limit . . . competition
among themselves.”); see also supra notes 168–69 (explaining how constraints on
negotiation and movement contribute to unraveling and inefficient results).
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candidates, the more quickly that participant will want to form a
match to avoid the risk of losing that partner. In this way, an
early offer can be a signal of preferences. If the early offer is an
accurate signal, and if participants respond by forming matches
based on these signals (perhaps because they benefit from
matching to partners who prefer them), early offers will generate
productive gains and an efficient result.
Unfortunately, early offers are quite noisy signals of
preferences for match partners. First, they are the product of
participant preferences at the time the match is formed, and not
their preferences at the time of the residency itself. As discussed
in subpart III.B, participants’ partner preferences may change
over time, both as their own needs change and as their
information base grows. Because the benefits of the match can
accrue only after the residency begins, it should be participants’
preferences at this later time that matter for the calculation of
aggregate social welfare.
In addition, early offers reflect not only the participants’
desire for a particular match, but also the level of uncertainty
that the participants face about the likelihood of other offers
materializing and the participants’ level of risk aversion.182 When
uncertainty exists, early offers may be preferable to late offers.
Individuals who are uncertain about their own qualifications, for
example, cannot possibly accurately forecast how well they might
fare if the matching process is delayed until more information is
revealed. Rather than face a broad distribution of potential
payoffs, they may prefer to establish a match early. In other
words, the match provides insurance value. This insurance value
complicates efforts to infer preferences about match outcomes
from offer timing. The decision to make or accept an early offer is
as much a signal of risk aversion as it is a signal of preference for
the other party. In general, early offers and acceptances may
provide some indication of market participants’ partner
preferences, but because they are the product of limited
information and risk aversion, they are not likely to produce
182. See, e.g., Hao Li & Wing Suen, Risk Sharing, Sorting, and Early Contracting,
108 J. POL. ECON. 1058, 1061 (2000) (“[E]arly contracting is positively related to the
degree of risk aversion of workers and to the degree of uncertainty regarding ability.”).
The importance of uncertainty and insurance value for equilibria in matching markets
has been explored mathematically in several papers on early contracting. See id.
(modeling competitive early contracting as a function of risk aversion); Hao Li & Wing
Suen, Self-Fulfilling Early-Contracting Rush, 45 INT’L ECON. REV. 301, 302 (2004)
(recognizing that “[i]ncentives to sign early contracts in a competitive market can be
understood in terms of the trade-off between the insurance benefits and the sorting
inefficiencies generated by early contracts”); Suen, supra note 117, at 103–05
(demonstrating that unraveling is related to risk aversion).
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matches of as high quality as those produced by matching
mechanisms.
Note, however, that the insurance value associated with
forming a partnership based on an early offer provides a real
benefit to a risk-averse prospective resident or clerk.183 While
some risks could be completely avoided through the use of a
matching mechanism—for example, the risk that a candidate will
be displaced by a less-qualified candidate because of information
failures—others, such as the risk that the candidate will prove to
be less qualified than he or she hopes, cannot. In an assessment
of total welfare, the insurance value of an early-offer system
should be taken into account along with the quality of the
resulting match. So too should the fact that early knowledge of a
match may facilitate planning; an applicant may want to know
the location of a future residency so that his or her spouse can
begin searching for employment in the same location, for
example. Because early-offer competition gives those who
experience high disutility from uncertainty the flexibility to
accept early offers, it may generate a higher level of benefit than
a coordinated match for at least some participants.
Just as uncoordinated and coordinated markets may produce
different levels of benefit, they may also entail different levels of
cost. The differences are likely to be insubstantial, however.
Costs associated with any matching process, coordinated or
uncoordinated, include the costs of collecting data about potential
match partners and of processing this data to determine one’s
rankings of potential partners. Establishing a relationship early
in the process allows participants to discontinue their search,
saving costs such as those associated with subsequent
interviews.184 But because it is important to establish a match
early, participants in the early-offer competition process must
prepare by evaluating potential partners in the same way that
participants of a coordinated match process would. Participants
must identify their preferred partners before the process begins,
so that they can arrange interviews sufficiently early to preserve
the possibility of an offer.185 Savings from having less information

183. See, e.g., Suen, supra note 117, at 117 (stating that “assignment markets tend to
produce a distribution of income that is more dispersed than the distribution of ability”
and that this dispersion creates a demand for insurance among market participants that
can be met through early contracting).
184. Chae observes that the match may reduce transaction costs by streamlining the
interview and bargaining process (as does Crall, supra note 1, at 270), but also argues
that it may escalate costs by increasing the number of interviews conducted by
participants fearful of failing to match. Chae, supra note 1, at 354.
185. Priest notes that in an unraveling market, participants are likely to invest in
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to evaluate at an early time would likely be offset by the
additional processing costs involved in trying to predict match
quality based on this information.186
Evaluating the relative welfare effects of early-offer
competition and a coordinated match requires weighing the
aggregate benefits and costs produced by each. If the costs of the
two competitive systems are indeed similar, the welfare
comparison turns on the question of whether the benefits
associated with the superior outcome of a coordinated match
exceed the benefits associated with flexible timing. The current
timing of the NRMP, in the spring of students’ fourth year, may
already reflect an implicit weighing of the gains from superior
matches resulting from the later timing of the match against the
gains from earlier resolution of uncertainty. If held later, the
match would give residents little advance notice of their future
assignments. If held earlier, preparations for the match would
need to begin in students’ third year, when they have just begun
their clinical rotations, depriving them of experience that may be
important for determining their desired career path. It is likely
that the timing of the match is satisfactory for the majority of
participants. Early-offer competition would allow those with a
preference for earlier matches to satisfy their preference, but
only at the cost of producing mismatches among those who, for
strategic reasons, must make or accept offers before they
otherwise would. There is no reason to expect that early-offer
competition would produce higher aggregate welfare for market
participants than would the match.
This welfare comparison of early-offer competition and the
residency match for the most part omits discussion of one of
match critics’ core complaints: the potential effect of the
residency match on compensation.187 In the medical residency
market, unlike the clerkship market, individual residency
programs are at least arguably empowered to compete with one
another by setting their own compensation levels.188 If the
pre-market research and sorting in order to obtain successful matches. Priest, supra note
26, at 163.
186. On the other hand, early offer competition might conserve costs because it
permits credible offers, which can serve as a low-cost source of information for other
parties. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (explaining that potential employers
who observe credible offers made by other employers can free ride off of these employers’
investment in assessing the quality of a candidate).
187. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 83 (alleging that the “matching program
has the purpose and effect of depressing, standardizing and stabilizing compensation”).
188. Salaries for federal clerks are determined in accordance with a federal formula
based on experience, bar membership, and locality. See Federal Law Clerk Information
System, Law Clerk Employment Information, https://lawclerks.ao.uscourts.gov/
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residency match mechanism affects not only the identities of
partners matched to each other, but also wage levels, then the
welfare analysis presented thus far is incomplete. It takes the
identities of the market participants as given, and uses the
benefits and costs accruing to these participants as the measure
of welfare. But distorted wages can affect the quantity and
identity of market participants, necessitating a broader welfare
analysis.
D. The Role of Compensation in an Efficiency Analysis
The plaintiffs argue that the NRMP’s actions in operating
the match have depressed compensation.189 To the extent that the
plaintiffs’ argument is correct, it raises two concerns. The first
concern is distributional: Any mechanism that depresses
compensation favors residency programs and disfavors residents.
Not-for-profit teaching hospitals that operate residency programs
cannot redistribute gains to owners or other affiliated
individuals, so any savings resulting from lower compensation
must be put to other uses.190 They could be passed through to
payers such as the federal government, which would then not
191
need to pay as much to support resident training. Alternatively,
they could be reallocated toward other aspects of the hospital’s
mission, such as conducting medical research or providing care

employinfo.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (describing criteria determining law clerk
salaries).
189. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 92.
190. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 134, at 308
(defining nonprofit institutions as firms that “either explicitly or implicitly do not exist to
make a profit”). Hospitals that wish to maintain tax exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the
Internal Revenue Code must ensure that no part of their net earnings “inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual.” 26 U.S.C. § 501 (c)(3) (2000).
191. Mark Pauly has similarly pointed out that if an insurer acts as an agent for
consumers, consumers can gain from the insurer’s exercise of monopsony power in its
purchase of medical services. Mark V. Pauly, Managed Care, Market Power, and
Monopsony, 33 HEALTH SERVS. RES. 1439, 1449 (1998). In contrast, a for-profit institution
exercising monopsony power is unlikely to pass on its price cut to customers. See id. at
1449–50 (noting that “all of the lower price paid to providers by monopsonistic insurers
might not get translated into lower final product prices for insureds”). Blair and Harrison
explain that if the monopsonist sells into a competitive market, it will charge the
competitive price; if it sells into a market in which it has monopoly power, it will charge a
higher price. ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND
ECONOMICS 39–42 (1993); see also Marius Schwartz, Econ. Dir. of Enforcement, U.S. Dep’t
of Justice, Address at the Fifth Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum at the Northwestern
University School of Law: Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-Prudential Merger, Part
II.B (Oct. 20, 1999), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/3924.pdf
(suggesting that monopsony power that lowers supplier prices may not ultimately benefit
consumers).
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for the indigent.192 Some might consider such a redistribution
appropriate in light of physicians’ future incomes or their status
as medical professionals, particularly when residency programs’
savings are redirected toward the production of public goods.
Others, however, would undoubtedly argue that it is unfair to
place the financial burden of supporting such functions on
residents already struggling with the burden of considerable
debt.193 While this fairness concern is not ordinarily part of an
antitrust analysis, Congress might choose to take it into account
when evaluating the merits of an antitrust exemption.
The second concern, however, is one arguably at the core of
antitrust law: the association between depressed compensation
and inefficiency. It is natural to think that lower resident wages
must translate to lower prices of care for patients, thus
increasing their consumption of care and, all else equal,
194
improving their welfare, but this is not necessarily the case. To
understand the relationship between low wages and efficiency in
a conventional market, first consider the relationship between
high prices and efficiency. Economic theory suggests that a seller
of a good who operates in a perfectly competitive market will
price the good at its marginal cost of production.195 If the seller
prices the good above cost, competitors will offer the same good at
a lower price and the seller will lose its customers. When goods
are priced at marginal cost, all consumers who value the good at
a level higher than the cost of production will purchase it. This is
an economically efficient outcome. A failure to consume a good
valued higher than its cost of production would impose a loss on

192. Skeptical observers might speculate that teaching hospitals would instead
allocate gains from savings toward administrators, other employees, or teaching
physicians, or squander the gains through inefficiency. An examination of this issue is
beyond the scope of this Article.
193. In 2003, the median amount of medical school debt for the 85% of public medical
school students who graduated with debt was $100,000. Paul Jolly, Medical School
Tuition and Young Physicians’ Indebtedness, 24 HEALTH AFF. 527, 528 (2005).
194. Chae suggests, for example, that “[i]t is also hard to believe that the Match
reduces output by decreasing the amount of health care that teaching hospitals provide.
Indeed, low salaries might increase output by enabling teaching hospitals to hire more
residents, leading to more health care.” Chae, supra note 1, at 354. Interestingly, such a
scenario would imply that residents’ stipends have not been depressed below competitive
levels. Specifically, if wages are depressed, hospitals should not be able to find additional
residents willing to work at the offered wages. If a hospital is able to attract additional
residents of comparable quality to its current residents after lowering its salary, then its
previous salary exceeded competitive levels.
195. See STEVEN E. LANDSBURG, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 188–89 (5th ed.
2002) (explaining that a firm operating in a competitive environment will produce goods
until the price of those goods equals the marginal cost of production).
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society. Marginal cost pricing achieves an efficient result because
it ensures that this sacrifice does not occur.196
By definition, companies with monopoly power can
197
successfully raise prices above marginal cost. The lone producer
who erects barriers to entry, or multiple producers who collude,
can successfully increase prices because there are no competitors
threatening to lure customers away with lower prices. When
producers with monopoly power raise prices, they will sell less
198
output relative to the perfectly competitive equilibrium. They
will end up selling their products only to the customers who
value the product the most.199 Customers who value the good
above its marginal cost, but below the monopoly price, will refuse
to purchase the good.200 Potential benefit to society will be
sacrificed as a result. Customers whose valuation falls between
marginal cost and the monopoly price will spend their money on
goods they value less, resulting in allocative inefficiency. The
harm to consumers from supracompetitive prices exceeds the
additional profits gained by producers.201 While some of the
surplus associated with consumption of the product is
transferred from consumer to producer through the higher price,
the remainder simply disappears because less of the product is
consumed. Monopolies are associated with supracompetitive
prices, which result in suboptimal quantities consumed and
therefore inefficiency.202
Reducing wages below competitive levels may similarly
203
result in allocative inefficiency. A seller who can raise output
196. More specifically, it is efficient because it ensures that neither sacrifice nor
waste occurs. If price were for some reason lower than cost, then consumers who value the
product less than its production cost may nonetheless consume it. The result is economic
waste.
197. See SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 62, at 161 (“When a firm has market
power in a particular market . . . the firm can raise the price of its product above its
marginal cost.”).
198. Or alternatively, producers with monopoly power are able to sustain high prices
by restricting the quantity of output sold. See LANDSBURG, supra note 195, at 344–45
(noting that monopolies restrict output to sustain higher prices and generate higher
profits).
199. See id. at 345 exhibit 10.2 (illustrating graphically that only those consumers
who value a product the most will purchase goods at monopoly price).
200. Id.
201. See id. at 344–45 (demonstrating that there is a net social welfare loss
associated with monopoly pricing because the consumers’ losses exceed the producer’s
gain).
202. See id.
203. See, e.g., BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 191, at 36–39 (explaining how
monopsony results in social welfare loss); Pauly, supra note 191, at 1445–51 (exploring
the circumstances under which monopsony can result in inefficiency); Schwartz, supra
note 191, Part II.A (describing the effects of monopsony).
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prices above the competitive level is said to have monopoly
power; a buyer who can depress input prices (such as wages)
below the competitive level is said to have monopsony power.204
While in the monopoly case a higher price is associated with a
lower quantity sold, in the monopsony case a lower price is
associated with a lower quantity bought.205 More specifically,
when a monopolist raises the price it charges for its output, some
of the customers who would have purchased output at the
competitive price will refuse to purchase output at the higher
206
price. When a monopsonist lowers the compensation it offers to
suppliers (such as workers), some of the suppliers who would
otherwise have been willing to supply a good or service (such as
207
labor) will refuse to do so. In the monopoly case, there is a
relationship between the higher output price charged and the
lower quantity sold; in the monopsony case, there is a
relationship between the lower input price offered and the lower
quantity of input bought.208 Monopolies result in allocative
inefficiency when consumers buy less valuable products;
monopsonies result in allocative inefficiency when workers divert
their time to leisure or accept employment in positions in which
they generate less value. Monopolies sacrifice gains from trade
between producers and consumers; monopsonies sacrifice gains
from trade between producers and suppliers (such as workers).209
Lower input prices achieved through the exercise of buyers’
market power may thus decrease social welfare.
One question to be asked in light of the resident antitrust
suit’s compensation claims is whether teaching hospitals exercise
monopsony power through the use of the match, thus decreasing
social welfare. If the reasoning of match critics were based on
this standard monopsony framework, it would go something like
this: hospitals collude through the match system in order to keep
the wages they pay low. These low wages cause inefficiency
because too few residents will work; residents who were willing
204. See THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS, supra note 134, at 290–91
(defining monopoly power); see also Schwartz, supra note 191, Part II.A (defining
monopsony power).
205. See Schwartz, supra note 191, Part II.A (explaining that the “monopolist raises
prices above the competitive level by restricting the quantity it sells” and that the
“monopsonist depresses the input price it pays below the competitive level by reducing the
input quantity it purchases”).
206. See id. (explaining that “at higher prices less is demanded”).
207. Alternatively, the monopsonist is able to sustain low input prices by restricting
the quantity of input purchased. Schwartz, supra note 191, Part II.A.
208. Id.
209. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 191, at 39 (noting that there are “unrealized
gains from further trade” between firms and workers in monopsonies).
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to work for the competitive wage now direct their efforts
elsewhere. If the match is associated with lower wages and the
hiring of fewer residents, the match likely decreases social
welfare by lowering total output.210
Match
proponents
would
likely
object
to
this
characterization of the match. Because the match dictates only
the mechanism for assigning residents to programs, and not
wage or employment levels, its rules do not directly facilitate the
211
creation of a collusive monopsony. The match itself does not
provide an enforcement mechanism that limits the number of
residents that teaching hospitals can seek, either individually or
212
collectively. An individual program might decide unilaterally to

210. The consumer welfare effects of a change of resident output depend critically on
the nature of the market for the services provided by residents. For example, if competing
nonteaching hospitals offer the very same services through nurse practitioners, nurses,
technicians, or nonresident physicians, and if they operate on a flat long-run marginal
cost curve, they can simply expand the services they provide by the same amount that the
teaching hospitals have decreased the services provided by residents. If total output is
unaffected, consumers remain unharmed by teaching hospitals’ actions. Since the “main
concern of the antitrust laws” is the consumer, the possibility that consumers might be
unaffected by the exercise of monopsony power raises the question of whether such
exercise should be viewed as an antitrust violation at all. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 12
ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 2011b1 (1999). If there is no output reduction, is there any antitrust
concern? Hovenkamp considers an example of bid rigging in the context of an auction. Id.
¶ 2011c. When all goods are sold, there is no reduction in output, just “mere wealth
transfer” from the seller to the buyer “that the antitrust laws were not designed to
remedy.” Id. Nonetheless, Hovenkamp suggests that the bid rigging should be a per se
violation of antitrust laws in part because of the long-run reduction in sellers’ incentive to
sell. Id. The Supreme Court has held that price-fixing by purchasers violates the Sherman
Act “even though . . . the persons specially injured under the treble damage claim are
sellers, not customers or consumers.” Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Am. Crystal Sugar
Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948). Seizing on this language, the Tenth Circuit rejected a
defendant’s argument that a monopsony should not be actionable unless it injures
consumers. Telecor Commc’ns, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1133–36
(10th Cir. 2002) (holding that suppliers can claim the protection of antitrust laws without
a showing of harm to consumers and dismissing language in two district court opinions
that implied otherwise).
211. See supra Part II (discussing the general rules and nature of the matching
process).
212. Other sorts of enforcement mechanisms may exist, however. In the years before
the match, medical educators limited the number of specialists by limiting the number of
residency positions available. LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 99. Today, the ACGME’s
Residency Review Committees may limit the number of residency positions available.
ACGME, Common Program Requirements § IV.B, available at http://www.acgme.org/
acWebsite/dutyHours/dh_dutyHoursCommonPR.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (“The RRC
will approve the number of residents based upon established written criteria that include
the adequacy of resources for resident education (e.g., the quality and volume of patients
and related clinical material available for education), faculty-resident ratio, institutional
funding, and the quality of faculty teaching.”). Teaching hospitals deemed to have too
many residents have lost their accreditation. See, e.g., Charles Ornstein, King/Drew
Medical Center States Its Case in Plea to Accrediting Council, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2003,
at B3 (reporting that a residency program lost its accreditation due to training more fifth-
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limit the number of residents it hires, but other programs may
then respond by hiring more residents. Similarly, the match
rules are completely silent on the issue of compensation, and a
unilateral effort to decrease the compensation offered is likely to
be unsuccessful.
Express restrictions on wages, however, are not the only
means of limiting compensation. The match-imposed limitations
on bargaining for higher salaries of the sort discussed in subpart
III.A, for example, may depress compensation without any
express agreement. The technical theoretical models of Kamecke
and Levin and Bulow described in subpart III.A also demonstrate
that under certain assumptions, the very structure of the match
can depress compensation;213 neither model depends on
coordinated limits on compensation or hiring to achieve its
214
results.
If compensation drops below competitive levels,
prospective residents may seek other positions, resulting in
inefficiency and the loss of social welfare.215
year residents than permitted). The antitrust suit challenged such limits. Complaint,
supra note 1, ¶ 88(a). But there is a procompetitive justification for such limits. In an
environment where it is difficult to assess the quality of care, patients may prefer to rely
on organizations such as the ACGME to ensure that physicians have received adequate
training. By enforcing resource-based limits on the number of residents, the ACGME may
be able to assure training quality more easily, thus promoting the sale of resident
services. See infra note 295 and accompanying text for a discussion of the effects of
limiting residency positions.
213. See supra notes 80, 82 and accompanying text.
214. See supra notes 80, 82 and accompanying text (describing the models).
215. This statement assumes that the more resident services provided, the higher
consumer welfare. If physicians lacking patients can induce their own demand by taking
advantage of patients’ lack of information about the appropriateness of treatment,
however, then social welfare might be improved by having fewer physicians. See Richard
A. Cooper & Linda H. Aiken, Human Inputs: The Health Care Workforce and Medical
Markets, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 925, 933–34 (2001) (considering the proposition
that “supplier-induced demand implies the provision of excessive or inappropriate care”
but concluding that “physician-induced demand is of small magnitude”). Peter Hammer
has suggested that “antitrust law should recognize a defense for private acts that restrain
‘competition’ under the traditional antitrust analysis but advance total welfare.” Peter J.
Hammer, Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the
Challenge of Intramarket Second-Best Tradeoffs, 98 MICH. L. REV. 849, 851 (2000). Those
who believe that the match reduces the quantity of physician services but also believe
that there are “too many” physicians could characterize the match as a private act that
advances total welfare. It is not clear, however, that match-induced downward wage
pressure would satisfy all of Hammer’s criteria for the exception. See id. (advancing four
requirements for a welfare defense). In addition, the debate over whether we have too
many or too few physicians largely revolves around efforts to predict consumer demand;
predictions of “too many” physicians have recently been displaced by predictions of “too
few” physicians. See Cooper & Aiken, supra, at 933 (stating that “shortages are
developing in some of the specialties”). See generally David Blumenthal, New Steam from
an Old Cauldron—The Physician-Supply Debate, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1780 (2004)
(“Just yesterday, it seems, the conventional wisdom was a confident prediction that we
faced a worrisome surplus of physicians. But today, a swelling chorus of experts contends
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The extent to which inefficiency might arise in the residency
market depends on a variety of institutional features. It is
possible that even with lower levels of compensation, the total
number of residents working would remain the same. There is
little evidence that substantial numbers of American-trained
medical graduates go unhired due to residency program
limitations; each year the vast majority of U.S. seniors are
216
The problematic
successfully matched through the NRMP.
monopsony effects outlined previously assume that total resident
supply is responsive to the compensation offered, but it is
possible that resident supply is fixed over the relevant wage
range. If the resident supply is unresponsive, the programs
would still be able to attract a full complement of residents,
despite the lower wages, and there would be no immediate
efficiency loss.
Even if in the short term all medical graduates are hired,
there may be a concern about the long-term effects of lower
resident compensation.217 Lower resident compensation may
translate into lower lifetime income for physicians, decreasing
the incentive to enter medical school.218 A substantial decrease in
wages would be required, however, for lower medical school
application rates to translate into lower numbers of U.S.educated residents. Over the last twenty years, the number of
applicants to U.S. medical schools has fluctuated, from 35,720 in

that we may face an equally worrisome shortage of physicians.”).
216. See supra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing placement in residency
programs). While most seniors in American medical schools find residency positions,
many international medical graduates do not. NAT’L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM,
RESULTS AND DATA: 2003 MATCH 5 (2003). The total number of residency position
applicants, including international medical graduates, exceeds the number of positions
listed in the match. Id. at 6–7. For example, the ratio of positions per U.S. senior was
approximately 1.5 in 2003, while the ratio of positions per applicant, including
international medical graduates, was 0.87. Id. at 7. The addition of international medical
graduates to the resident market will tend to shift the resident supply curve outward,
decreasing compensation for existing residents, but improving social welfare. See THOMAS
A. PUGEL, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 361–63 (12th ed. 2004) (showing graphically that
addition of migrants to a labor market decreases equilibrium wages but produces gains
for the market’s employers that exceed the losses to the market’s existing employees).
217. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 191, at 72 (explaining that although a
collusive monopsony in a market with a fixed supply of wheat has only distributive
consequences in the short run, “[a]s producer profits are reduced by the collusion, their
incentives to plant durum wheat are reduced and they may reduce supply in the future
[which has] adverse consequences for consumer welfare in the future”).
218. Lower resident compensation translates into lower lifetime income for
physicians, assuming that there is no corresponding increase in income during postresidency years. For an analysis suggesting that actions that decrease the number of
residents may increase long-term physician income, see infra note 295.
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1982-83 to 46,965 in 1996-97, and back to 33,625 in 2002-03.219
But the number of accepted applicants has not varied nearly as
much. The number of applicants accepted was 17,294 in 1982-83,
220
17,385 in 1996-97, and 17,592 in 2002-03.
The ratios of
applicants to accepted applicants were therefore 2.1:1.0, 2.7:1.0,
and 1.9:1.0, respectively.221 Far more people desire to become
physicians than actually become physicians. Lower stipends
might discourage some students from entering the profession,
but the high ratio of applications to acceptances indicates that
others would be willing to take their places. Lower stipends are
unlikely to have a significant dynamic effect on the quantity of
U.S. residents.222
They can, however, have a dynamic effect on the quality of
U.S. residents. Talented and productive college graduates facing
lucrative alternative career paths may choose to pursue those
opportunities rather than enrolling in medical school because the
bargaining power of the residency programs depresses wages just
enough to make a difference. These potential applicants’ medical
school positions, and later, residency positions, may be taken
over by lower-quality applicants.223 If medical schools apply an
absolute quality screen to applicants so that they refuse to admit
applicants of lower quality, lower wages may be associated with
fewer U.S. residents; if medical schools apply a relative quality
screen to applicants so that they have a set number of positions
available and will fill them with lower-quality applicants if
necessary, lower wages will be associated with lower-quality
residents.224 The degree to which the quality of residents would
decline depends on the extent to which the students who fill the

219. Barbara Barzansky & Sylvia I. Etzel, Educational Programs in US Medical
Schools, 2002-2003, 290 JAMA 1190, 1192 tbl.3 (2003).
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. This may change if the number of medical school positions increases. In 2005,
the AAMC recommended a 15% increase in medical school enrollment by 2015. Press
Release, AAMC, AAMC Calls for Modest Increase in Medical School Enrollment (Feb. 22,
2005), available at http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/pressrel/2005/050222.htm.
223. Cf. Pauly, supra note 191, at 1451 (noting that in health insurance, monopsony
may be associated with “lower quality, rather than . . . fewer people insured”).
224. In 1989, when the ratio of first-time applicants to medical school places fell to
1.2:1.0, some medical schools declined to fill their classes. Cooper & Aiken, supra note
215, at 931. It appears, then, that in 1989 medical schools perceived the quality of
rejected applicants to be lower than that of their accepted counterparts. See id. (reasoning
that “as a means of maintaining quality” the schools did not fill their classes). On the
other hand, the AAMC has recently advocated an expansion of medical school enrollment,
and the AAMC’s president argues that this expansion would not decrease quality. See
Myrle Croasdale, Physician Shortage?: Push Is on for More Med Students, AM. MED.
NEWS, Mar. 14, 2005, at 1.
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vacated medical school slots can, with training, become residents
of comparable quality to the students they replace.
The sensitivity of prospective residents—or prospective
medical school applicants—to resident compensation levels is
ultimately an empirical question. While reductions in potential
lifetime income will affect the quantity or quality of resident
supply on the margin, institutional features of the graduate
medical education process are likely to limit the magnitude of the
effects. The role of the residency position as the sole gateway to a
future career in medicine will tend to limit the responsiveness of
the resident supply to resident compensation. State licensure
laws generally require that physicians receive training in a
residency
program
as
a
precondition
to
practicing
independently.225 Students who decide not to pursue a residency
therefore also forgo any income that would be derived from
professional practice. Because for many students the average
income of medical practice is likely to exceed that of any other
career path, they have a financial incentive to join a residency
program, even if the compensation during residency years is
low.226 Because the residency market is linked to the market for
physician services, and state legislatures impose a barrier to
entry in the market for physician services, students may join
residency programs even if the initial compensation is not as
high as it could otherwise be. The higher compensation earned by
physicians insulated by state licensure laws against competition
tends to offset the negative incentive effects that would otherwise
result from lower resident compensation.227
While the discussion so far has focused on the relationship
between potential residents’ demand for residency positions and
efficiency, Kamecke focuses on the flip side of the analysis: the
relationship between teaching hospitals’ demand for residents
228
and efficiency. In the Kamecke model, inefficiency arises from

225. See, e.g., N.Y. State Educ. Dep’t, supra note 37 (listing the requirements for
becoming a licensed physician in the state of New York).
226. One author suggests that the net present value of an investment in medical
school education is over one million dollars. Jolly, supra note 193, at 534.
227. This argument assumes that potential future physicians consider lifetime
income, rather than just the income during residency years, when deciding whether to
join the profession. If students expect their financial needs to exceed their income during
their residency years and also expect to have insufficient access to credit, they may choose
another career. See id. at 531 (reporting survey results finding that the cost of medical
school was a significant deterrent to prospective medical school applicants). Educators
have long been concerned that low resident compensation might deter students from
pursuing training; such concerns were articulated even before the match began.
LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 424 n.93.
228. Kamecke, supra note 80, at 33.
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the possibility that the low compensation levels assured by
competitive restraints associated with the match will lead
hospitals to employ inefficient numbers of residents relative to
their substitutes (such as nonresident physicians, nurses, or
technicians).229 In other words, the match introduces distortions
of wages that affect programs’ decisions about whether to hire
residents in the first place. These distortions can lead to
inefficient levels of hiring.
The Bulow-Levin model focuses on yet another
compensation-related source of inefficiency: mismatches. Even if
the residency match does not affect the total number of residents
hired, it can reduce welfare if it assigns candidates to the
“wrong” positions, ones in which they do not achieve their
maximum productivity. In the Bulow-Levin model, when the
programs offer a uniform compensation rate to all of their
residents, they choose a compensation strategy that is rational
230
but nonetheless results in some mismatches. In particular, the
equilibrium compensation strategy of each participating program
will be “mixed” in the sense that the program will randomize
compensation offers over a particular range.231 Sometimes (i.e.,
with some probability), the chosen compensation will be
sufficiently high for the program to beat out its competitors in
the race to attract the most productive match, and the efficient
match will therefore result; other times, however, the chosen
compensation will be too low, and the program’s desired resident
will go to a competitor—an inefficient result.232
Similarly, a resident not able to use a firm offer to negotiate
a higher salary because of residency match constraints on prematch contracting might argue that this prohibition results in
inefficient matches. More specifically, the firm offer helps to
convey information to the market about the value of a particular
resident.233 Without this information, a residency program may
underestimate the value of an individual applicant, while at the
same time perhaps overestimating the value of others. As a
result, the program will offer a low stipend, and the applicant
will choose another program that may ultimately generate a

229. Id. at 47–48.
230. Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, at 18–19 (“Because there is mixing, firms and
workers may not be efficiently matched.”).
231. Id. at 6–11.
232. See generally id. (computing the probabilities of efficient results when offers are
randomized).
233. See supra Part III.A.
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lower value from that resident. Again, the result is an inefficient
mismatch.
To summarize, the reason that low compensation is
problematic from an efficiency perspective is that it results in an
equilibrium where potential residents do not take the positions in
which they would be the most productive. Low compensation
levels send the wrong signals. A prospective medical student
might choose another profession; a teaching hospital, an
inefficient mix of employees; a prospective resident, the wrong
residency program. In each case, resources are wasted.
The magnitude of this waste, however, is likely to be limited.
As previously discussed, the nature of the market for physician
services (for example, the role of resident training as a
prerequisite for physician licensure) will tend to constrain the
magnitude of compensation-related distortions in the resident
market. In addition, while Bulow and Levin do find some
inefficiencies in the presence of a match, the magnitude of the
234
distortion is small. The reason the distortion is small is that
the compensation range over which each program randomizes
235
overlaps with that of its closest competitors. The overlapping
compensation ranges of programs of similar quality mean that
when a resident is assigned to the “wrong” program from the
standpoint of efficiency (because the resident ranked more highly
the program that happened to offer the higher compensation),
the “wrong” program is close in quality to the “right” program.
The localized nature of the compensation competition ensures
that the inefficiency that arises from the mismatches will be
small.236 A numerical calculation suggests that the more firms
and workers involved in a matching process, the lower the level
of inefficiency.237 With 1,000 firms and 1,000 workers
participating, for example, the calculation shows only a 0.04%
238
loss in efficiency.
Moreover, this decrease in efficiency is measured relative to
the competitive ideal—the perfect match. Because of the lack of

234. See Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, at 3 (finding that “the inefficiency in the
market will be small”).
235. See id. at 6–10, 19 (explaining the small loss of efficiency associated with
randomizing offers).
236. Id. at 3, 19 (suggesting that inefficiency is limited when “firms compete ‘locally’
against similar opponents”).
237. See id. at 22 (showing a decrease in inefficiency as the number of firms
participating in a matching program increases).
238. See id. The 0.04% loss in efficiency is calculated by dividing the inefficiency
associated with 1000 firms by the surplus realized by generating an efficient match. Id.
tbl.2.
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information that characterizes unraveling markets, there is no
reason to expect that a residency market without a matching
mechanism will achieve the perfect match.239 This observation is
also relevant to an assessment of the concerns raised by
Kamecke’s article. Kamecke himself acknowledges the
importance of comparing the results of the matching mechanism
to the appropriate counterfactual:
One has to keep in mind that the centralized procedure
could solve the ‘unraveling’ phenomenon described by
Roth . . . which can lead to serious distortions inside the
matching market. As long as one cannot control these
problems in a decentralized system, it is not useful to
abolish a workable centralized mechanism just because
240
some distortions may remain.
Thus, gains from implementing a centralized matching
mechanism may exceed losses associated with any match-related
compensation effects.
Subpart III.B has already demonstrated how unraveling
markets generate subpar matches that can reduce benefits to
programs, residents, and the public (if a poor match reduces the
quantity of medical research, for example). Unraveling markets
may also give rise to monopsony power issues of their own. One
recognized source of monopsony power is ignorance of the
supplier of the purchased goods or services about other potential
241
If early offers or exploding offers do not give
buyers.
participants sufficient time to solicit alternative offers, teaching
programs will have considerable market power with respect to
242
individual applicants. While it would be ideal for residents to
search for positions and to use an offer by one firm to increase
the stipend offered by another, a resident with an exploding offer
243
may not have the opportunity to do so. An empirical study of
the gastroenterologist fellowship market further suggests that
the scope of labor markets is smaller in decentralized matching

239. See, e.g., Roth & Xing, supra note 91, at 1034–35 (“Unraveling may be ex ante
as well as ex post inefficient . . . .”).
240. Kamecke, supra note 80, at 48.
241. See ALAN MANNING, MONOPSONY IN MOTION: IMPERFECT COMPETITION IN LABOR
MARKETS 360 (2003) (describing “ignorance among workers about labor market
opportunities” as a source of friction that gives employers monopsony power).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 97–101 (discussing exploding offers to
residents and law clerks).
243. See supra text accompanying note 100 (reasoning that a candidate with an
exploding offer may not want to allow it to explode, given the candidate’s uncertainty
about future offers).
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markets than in centralized matching markets.244 The fewer
employers effectively participating in the market, the more
market power they are likely to have in setting wages.
Abandoning the match may limit some forms of market power
exercised by residency training programs, but it may allow for
the introduction of others.
The possibility that the match may under some
circumstances depress wages relative to the competitive ideal
thus tells us little about its social desirability. The compensationrelated effects of the match depend on multiple variables,
including the sensitivity of residents to compensation, and any
effects are likely to be outweighed by the benefits to residents,
programs, and society generated through improved matching.
IV. THE EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON RESIDENT COMPENSATION
One way to investigate the net effects of the match on
resident compensation is to examine the empirical evidence. In
their complaint, the plaintiffs cite data that first-year residents
earned a salary of about $35,700 during the 2000-01 employment
year in support of their claim that anticompetitive restraints,
including the match, have depressed compensation.245 The mean
first-year resident compensation for an institution offering
residency programs during the academic year 2003-04 was
$39,809.246 To determine whether this compensation is below

244. See generally Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, Unraveling Reduces Mobility in
a Labor Market: Gastroenterology with and Without a Centralized Match, 111 J. POL.
ECON. 1342 (2003) (comparing the entry-level market for gastroenterologists in the years
in which it was centralized with the same market in the years prior and subsequent to
centralization). When no centralized matching mechanism was in operation, fellows
tended to be matched more often at the same hospitals and in the same cities where they
worked as residents. Id. at 1343–44. This phenomenon could result from the need to rely
on informal networks to share information about market participants. Id. at 1344.
245. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 93.
246. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., supra note 18, at 6. In real terms, this mean salary
represents an increase of 0.8% over the 2002-03 year, a 2.2% increase over the 2000-01
year, a 6.4% increase over the 1990-91 year, and an 8.2% increase over the 1980-81 year,
but only a 1.2% increase over the 1970-71 year. Id. In their complaint, the plaintiffs cite
stability of wages as one of the effects of the allegedly anticompetitive restraints.
Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 93. It is difficult to determine what the appropriate
benchmark should be, given that supply and demand conditions can vary tremendously
across markets. Statistics for similar markets, however, suggest that wage growth might
indeed be low. Hospitals’ employment costs overall for civilian workers increased 9%
between March of 1990 and 2003; the similar figure for private employers of professional
specialty and technical occupations was 11%. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, EMPLOYMENT COST INDEX, CONSTANT DOLLAR, HISTORICAL LISTING 22 tbl.3, 69
tbl.5a (Apr. 29, 2005), available at http://www.bls.gov/web/ecconst.pdf.
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competitive levels, it is important to first identify the appropriate
benchmark.
One possible comparison is to practicing nonresident
physicians; residents make significantly less. One survey found
that the average net income from medical practice in 1999 was
247
$187,000, for example. But residents, particularly first-year
residents, will not be as productive as more experienced
physicians,248 so it is not surprising that their compensation is
significantly lower. Compensation does increase with the number
of years in the program: The resident-weighted mean stipend in
2004-05 was $40,552 for a first-year resident, $44,122 for a third249
year resident, and $47,783 for a fifth-year resident. On the
other hand, even the highest amount does not approach the mean
earnings for nonresident physicians.250 This discrepancy is
particularly glaring since the residency programs that require
five years of training tend to be for the more highly compensated
specialties, such as surgery; the average compensation after
251
expenses for surgeons in 2002 was approximately $255,000.
Resident compensation might also be compared to that of
other health care providers. The plaintiffs allege that “[r]esidents
generally earn less, on both an annualized and hourly basis, than
other hospital employees such as nurse practitioners and
252
physician assistants.” In 2002, the median annual income for
247. MARIE REED & PAUL B. GINSBURG, CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM
CHANGE, DATA BULL. NO. 24, BEHIND THE TIMES: PHYSICIAN INCOME, 1995-99 (2003),
available at http://www.hschange.org/CONTENT/544.
248. Cf. Robert S. Huckman & Jason R. Barro, Cohort Turnover and Productivity:
The July Phenomenon in Teaching Hospitals 30–31 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 11182, 2005), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w11182.pdf
(finding that the annual turnover of residents at a hospital reduces hospital productivity).
249. ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., supra note 18, at 9. The relatively low rate of
increase of stipends over program years and the sudden jump in physician salaries after
residency completion suggest that stipend levels reflect factors other than resident
productivity. One possibility is that given the transaction costs associated with moving
between programs, residents and programs both view the residency program as a multiyear relationship, with competition occurring at the point of entry into the program. See
supra notes 168–69 (discussing impediments to moving between programs). If so,
programs may choose to smooth compensation over the life of a program by paying
residents high stipends (relative to productivity) at the beginning of the program, and
lower stipends toward the end. Other explanations of stipend levels are considered infra,
notes 256–76 and accompanying text.
250. See REED & GINSBURG, supra note 247 (reporting that the average net income
for all patient care physicians in 1999 was $187,000).
251. According to the Medical Group Management Association, the median total
compensation for family practice physicians in 2002 was $150,267; for internists, it was
$155,530; and for surgeons, it was $255,438. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (2004-05), available at http://www.bls.gov/
oco/pdf/ocos074.pdf.
252. Complaint, supra note1, ¶ 93.
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physician assistants employed in hospitals was $65,910; median
income for first-year physician assistants in all settings was
$64,670.253 The annual compensation of residents is therefore less
than the income of not only physicians who have completed their
training, but also other professionals who have fewer years of
formal training and who share some of the residents’ duties.254 A
hospital that must substitute other workers for residents is likely
to find that its salary expenses increase. Some have estimated
that the ACGME’s recently-imposed limits on resident work
hours will result in increased hiring of nurse practitioners and
others at a cost that could reach into the millions of dollars for
large academic medical centers.255
Comparisons of monetary compensation alone are
misleading, however, because in addition to their stipends,
residents receive compensation in the form of training.256 While
the plaintiffs characterize the market being restrained as a
market for resident services, the market in question could just as
easily have been characterized as a market for resident
education.257 Residency programs generally involve formal

253. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, supra note 251. For more detailed descriptions of
1997 earnings data, see American Academy of Physician Assistants, PA Incomes: Results
from the 1997 AAPA Physician Assistant Census, available at http://www.aapa.
org/research/97income.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005).
254. While the market for resident services overlaps with the market for the services
of physician assistants and other hospital employees, the markets are not coextensive.
Teaching hospitals compete mainly among themselves for the services of residents, while
they must compete with community hospitals, physician practices, and other potential
employers for the services of other types of health care workers. The differences in
demand for these types of labor may contribute to compensation differentials. In
particular, some hospitals may prefer not to hire residents because of the training costs
that would be entailed.
255. See Katherine Vogt, Hospitals Count Up Cost of Reduced Resident Hours, AM.
MED. NEWS, Aug. 11, 2003, at 19, 19.
256. Others have noted that the exchange of educational services for patient services
complicates the assessment of compensation and the antitrust case. See, e.g., Peter J.
Hammer & William M. Sage, Critical Issues in Hospital Antitrust Law, 22 HEALTH AFF.
88, 93 (2003) (noting that a “twist” to the NRMP litigation is that “two markets are
involved simultaneously: teaching hospitals acting as buyers of residents’ clinical services,
and residents acting as buyers of graduate medical education”); Miller & Greaney, supra
note 1, at 915 (recognizing that “medical residents are buyers of educational services from
seller residency programs” as well as sellers of labor to the buyer hospitals). The training
and service aspects of residency positions and the tensions between them have long been
recognized. See, e.g., LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 92 (describing the many duties of
residents and stating that “[a]chieving the proper balance between education and service
would perplex medical educators throughout the twentieth century”).
257. This characterization may reflect a strategic decision by the plaintiffs. Courts
have previously recognized that monopsonistic practices in employment are subject to
antitrust laws. See, e.g., HOVENKAMP, supra note 210, ¶ 2012c (“[A] naked agreement
among employers limiting salaries or wages is unlawful per se.”). The Third Circuit has
stated, however, that “[i]t may be that institutions of higher education ‘require that a
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training sessions and direct supervision by faculty physicians.258
When they provide their services, residents are also gaining
experience. More advanced residents may have limited
interaction with faculty, but still practice in a teaching hospital
environment, which will generally expose them to a broader
range of learning opportunities (such as more difficult or unusual
cases) than is available to most physicians. The compensation
that residents receive for their efforts therefore includes not just
a stipend and other employment benefits, but also the valuable
training that will serve as a foundation upon which to build their
careers. The fact that training can be very valuable is evidenced
by physicians who pursue fellowship opportunities after their
residencies, sacrificing the income of independent practice in
favor of stipends averaging in the $40,000 range.259
One way to incorporate the value of training into an
assessment of resident compensation is to reconceptualize the
meager residency stipend as a much higher stipend that has been
reduced implicitly by tuition. Undergraduate students typically
do not produce significant value for their institutions through
their labor and so must pay substantial tuition for the education
they receive. Graduate students typically do produce value for
260
their institutions, through research or teaching assistantships.
Because this value offsets the tuition they would otherwise pay,
graduate students often pay only a small amount of tuition, or
pay no tuition at all and receive a small stipend.261 Residents
produce more value for their institutions than most graduate

particular practice, which could properly be viewed as a violation of the Sherman Act in
another context, be treated differently.’” United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658, 678
(3d Cir. 1993) (quoting Goldfarb v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 773, 788 n.17 (1975)). For a
discussion of the potential applicability of the court’s analysis in Brown University to the
residency match case, see Miller & Greaney, supra note 1, at 917–18, and Chae, supra
note 1, at 353–54.
258. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 32.
259. See Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, Letter to the Editor, Relationship Between
Wages and Presence of a Match in Medical Fellowships, 290 JAMA 1153, 1153 (2003)
(documenting fellowship compensation in various subspecialties). For further evidence of
the value of training, see supra note 171 and accompanying text (describing the relative
importance of training and compensation in the choice of residency positions).
260. See, e.g., Univ. of Houston, Graduate Catalog Online, University Policies for
Graduate Student Assistantships, http://www.uh.edu/grad_catalog/grad_assistantship/
uh_policy.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005) (listing five graduate student appointment
categories: “teaching fellow, teaching assistant, instructional assistant, research
assistant, and graduate assistant”).
261. See, e.g., Univ. of Houston, Graduate Catalog Online, Graduate Assistant
Tuition Fellowship Policy for Students in TA/TF/IA/RA/GA Appointment Categories,
http://www.uh.edu/grad_catalog/grad_assistantship/gatf.html (last visited Oct. 1, 2005)
(allowing for nine resident credit hours of support per regular semester to be awarded to
eligible graduate students).
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students, and receive a higher stipend than graduate students.262
But where tuition may be explicit for some graduate students, it
is implicit for medical residents: They pay it in the form of lower
263
stipends than they might otherwise receive. Residents, like
other students, are willing to pay this tuition because of the longterm benefits their training provides. In fact, one study has
suggested that some residents would be willing to pay teaching
hospitals for residency positions in dermatology, general surgery,
orthopedic surgery, and radiology because physicians working in
these areas receive high financial returns from their training.264
Thus, while resident compensation may appear low compared to
that of experienced physicians and other health care
professionals, it is difficult to know whether this data
demonstrates an anticompetitive effect because these comparison
groups are not receiving comparable training.265 In other words,
262. See ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS., supra note 18, at 3, 5 tbl.1 (reporting that the
average stipend of first-year residents in 2004-05 was $40,788).
263. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, RETHINKING MEDICARE’S PAYMENT
POLICIES FOR GRADUATE MEDICAL EDUCATION AND TEACHING HOSPITALS 7 (1999).
264. Sean Nicholson, Barriers to Entering Medical Specialties (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 9649, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w9649.
265. Some analysts might protest that most employment has a training component to
it, and yet significant salaries are still paid. Recent law school graduates, for example,
often earn significantly more than recent medical school graduates, despite also receiving
on-the-job training. See Priest, supra note 26, at 188 tbl.7 (reporting, for example, that the
seventy-fifth percentile starting salary for medical school graduates in the South was
$35,300, while the comparable figure for law graduates in Georgia was $100,000). Is there
any explanation for the compensation difference, beyond anticompetitive restraints in the
residency market? One possibility is a difference in demand facing the employer; law firm
clients may have a higher willingness to pay for law firm associates’ services than
government and other purchasers are prepared to pay for residents’ services. A second
possibility is that physicians must have residency training to practice independently,
while lawyers can practice independently without on-the-job training; physicians will
therefore be less sensitive to low compensation levels in the short term. A third possibility
is that law firms’ decisions about compensation, at least traditionally, have been made in
the context of a potential long-term relationship. Recruiting and training a new lawyer
may cost upward of $200,000. See Brenda Sandberg, Who’ll Stop the Raids?, AM. LAW.,
June 2000, at 20. For this reason it may take two to three years before a law firm
associate begins to financially benefit a firm. Joel A. Rose, Adjusting Compensation for
Today’s Economics, PENN. L. WKLY., Oct. 14, 2002, at F6, F6 (“Most [hiring partners]
acknowledged that during the first two or three years with the firm, while in training to
learn how to practice law, the great majority of associates are not worth the current
market price.”). Law firms may be willing to provide training and high salaries because
they anticipate that their efforts will not only attract top-notch associates to the firm, but
also encourage them to remain; top-notch associates will eventually become profitgenerating firm partners. See Ginsburg & Wolf, supra note 152, at 953–54 (explaining
that while “a residency director picks a future co-worker[,] . . . a hiring partner picks a
potential future co-owner” who may affect that “partner’s personal financial and
reputational equity over years to come”). The trajectory for residents is different. While
hospitals could conceivably make long-term arrangements with some of their residents
(and some residents’ programs already last longer than three years), the nature of
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the total benefit received by medical residents may not actually
be low relative to other providers when both monetary and
nonmonetary forms of compensation are included in the
calculation.266
Ultimately, competitive compensation levels are determined
by supply and demand, and supply and demand conditions differ
for each of the groups that might be compared to residents, for
reasons unrelated to the match. It is therefore unsurprising that
compensation levels would differ. As previously explained,
employers will likely be willing to offer higher compensation to
experienced physicians than to residents, and residents are more
likely to accept lower compensation than physician assistants,
267
because of the on-the-job training the residents receive. But
compensation levels may differ for other supply- and demandrelated reasons as well.
For example, in addition to providing training, residency
positions also provide the credentials necessary for a future
268
career as a physician. Participation in a residency program is a
precondition both for future licensure as a physician and for
269
board certification. Given these benefits of residency programs,
it is not surprising that demand for these positions is high or that
residents are willing to work for less monetary compensation
270
than other professionals (such as physician assistants).
In
2003, there were 23,965 active applicants—including 14,332 U.S.
senior students, 1,987 U.S. foreign graduates, and 5,029 non-U.S.

physicians’ work often changes after their training is complete. Many physicians develop
office-based rather than hospital-based practices; while such physicians may on occasion
care for hospitalized patients, they are often not hospital employees and are not required
to admit their patients to any particular hospital. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
supra note 251 (noting that less than one quarter of physicians are employed by
hospitals). Thus, hospitals may not ultimately receive the long-run returns that justify
law firms’ high level of investment in and compensation of their associates. See Chae,
supra note 1, at 355 (noting hospitals’ disincentive to train because “laborers can leave
and take their skills elsewhere”).
266. Students benefiting from training provide their services at low cost in other
professions as well. Nursing students, for example, have also traditionally served as a
source of cheap labor. See LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 422 n.61 (citing SUSAN M.
REVERBY, ORDERED TO CARE: THE DILEMMA OF AMERICAN NURSING, 1850-1945 (1987)).
267. See supra note 171 and accompanying text (discussing the value residents place
on the educational benefit of residency programs).
268. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (discussing the residency
requirement).
269. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
270. See Crall, supra note 1, at 270 (noting the “steep nature of the demand curve for
medical residencies” arising from the gateway role of medical residencies). For further
discussion of the gateway effect, see supra subpart III.D (explaining that low residency
compensation might not deter potential residents because of the long-run benefits of a
medical career).
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foreign graduates—for 20,908 positions.271 While supply and
demand conditions for each program vary, the higher the number
of qualified applicants, the less programs will need to pay to
272
attract candidates, all else equal.
Teaching hospitals’ demand for residents (and thus, the
supply of residency positions) will depend on the costs and
benefits of employing residents, costs and benefits that are likely
to differ from those associated with employing other health care
professionals. Costs of employing residents include the direct
273
costs of training, such as the cost of physician supervision.
Other costs are indirect. An analysis based on 1981 data
indicated that inpatient hospital costs “increase[d] by about 5.8
percent for every 10 percent increase in the resident-to-bed ratio”
of the hospital.274 In part, these higher costs may result from
inefficiencies in residents’ provision of care; residents may, for
example, order more tests than more experienced physicians
would.275 To the extent that these costs are connected with the
employment of residents, rather than other professionals, they
may affect the demand for residents and thus affect equilibrium
resident compensation.276
Teaching hospitals’ demand for residents is also determined
by the benefit residents generate, which in turn is derived in part
from the demand of payers for resident and teaching hospital
services. Historical evidence suggests that resident compensation
increases in the post-World War II (and post-match) era were
tied to reimbursement by private insurers and the creation of
Medicare and Medicaid, programs that provided financial
support for graduate medical education.277 Today, Medicare

271. See NAT’L RESIDENT MATCHING PROGRAM, supra note 216, at 5, 7.
272. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 6–7
(1985) (discussing the basic economic principles of supply and demand).
273. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: MEDICARE
PAYMENT POLICY 53 (2003).
274. Id. at 55.
275. See Huckman & Barro, supra note 248, at 11 (describing studies finding that
inexperienced physicians tend to provide more costly care). Higher costs may also reflect
teaching hospitals’ tendency to offer sophisticated technological services. Such services
are expensive to provide and also attract more severely ill patients than nonteaching
hospitals typically serve. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 263, at 5.
276. One commentator suggests that the cost of training medical residents in fact
exceeds the value these residents generate until the residents’ third year of residency.
Christine Wiebe, Federal Cuts for Medical Training—Bad Medicine or Chance to
Improve?, ACP OBSERVER, July 1996, at 1, available at http://www.acponline.org/journals/
news/jul96/fedcuts.htm.
277. See LUDMERER, supra note 39, at 192 (arguing that interns and residents
received salaries for the first time as a result of private insurers’ policy to reimburse
hospitals for their services, and stating that in the four years after the passage of
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provides the bulk of financial support tied explicitly to the
employment of residents.278 When a resident provides care to a
Medicare beneficiary, the resident is not permitted to bill
Medicare for his or her physician services as a nonresident
physician would.279 Medicare instead compensates the hospital for
the resident’s services through its “direct” funding of the
280
In 1998,
Graduate Medical Education (GME) program.
Medicare direct GME payments totaled over two billion dollars.281
To compensate for the higher costs of operating a teaching
hospital, Medicare also applies an “indirect” medical education
adjustment to the formula it would otherwise use to pay for the
282
hospital care supplied to Medicare patients. This formula, like
the direct GME formula, depends in part on the number of
residents participating in an institution’s GME program.283
Specifically, it increases the amount a teaching hospital would
otherwise receive by a factor based on the resident-to-bed ratio of
the hospital.284 In 1998, for example, the formula mandated that
hospitals receive a seven percent increase in reimbursement for
every ten percent increase in the resident-to-bed ratio.285 In that
year, Medicare paid nearly five billion dollars in indirect medical
286
education subsidies. Although there is no requirement that the
direct or indirect medical education subsidies be passed on to

Medicare and Medicaid, the median house staff salary doubled).
278. See Wiebe, supra note 276 (“Through Medicare’s hospital trust fund[,] . . . the
federal government foots the bill for much of this training by including payment for direct
and indirect teaching costs in hospital reimbursements.”).
279. 42 C.F.R. § 415.200 (2004). Medicare may, however, be billed for physicians’
services if a teaching physician personally furnishes services to a patient, or if the
resident furnishes the service in the presence of a teaching physician. § 415.170. Medicare
will also pay for physicians’ services provided by residents who are fully licensed and are
“moonlighting” by providing services outside of their residency program (in a hospital
emergency room, for example). § 415.208. The antitrust suit plaintiffs offered as evidence
of anticompetitive behavior the fact that hourly resident compensation was “substantially
lower than what those same physicians can (and sometimes do) earn providing services to
a hospital during off-duty hours (‘moonlighting’).” Complaint, supra note 1, ¶ 93. The fact
that Medicare reimburses for physician services provided by residents while
moonlighting, but not for services provided through the residency program, may
contribute to this compensation differential.
280. See generally 42 C.F.R. §§ 413.75–.83.
281. COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., FIFTEENTH REPORT, FINANCING GRADUATE
MEDICAL EDUCATION IN A CHANGING HEALTH CARE ENVIRONMENT 23 tbl.1 (2000),
available at http://www.cogme.gov/15.pdf.
282. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 273, at 53.
283. See id.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 55. The IME adjustment for 2003 was 5.5%. Id.
286. COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., supra note 281, at 23 tbl.1.
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residents, Medicare financing helps to support resident
compensation at its current levels.287
On the other hand, the lower the overall reimbursement
levels for resident and teaching hospital services—and the higher
the costs of resident training—the less teaching hospitals will be
willing and able to pay to obtain resident services, all else equal.
Medicare provides significant financial support for the provision
of medical education, but not so much that every hospital chooses
288
While private payers historically
to employ residents.
subsidized education-related costs through higher payments to
teaching hospitals, these subsidies have diminished in recent
289
years. In general, it is clear that the relationship between the
employment of a resident and financial benefit to a teaching
hospital is complex; the economics of employing a resident are
quite different from those of employing a nonresident physician
or a physician assistant. Compensation levels for residents are
therefore likely to differ from those for other medical
professionals.290
Instead of comparing residents to nonresidents, the ideal
empirical analysis would compare residents to residents. More
specifically, it would compare the compensation of residents in a
market with a matching mechanism to the compensation of the
same residents in the same market without such a mechanism.
Unfortunately, since a market cannot simultaneously have a
match and not have a match, such a comparison is impossible to
observe in practice. An alternative methodology would involve
comparing compensation before and after a market adopts a
match. While no published study appears to have undertaken a
systematic analysis of this sort, historical research has shown

287. Several scholars have noted the direct connection between residency education
subsidies and the demand for residents, although not necessarily the indirect connection
between subsidies and the wages paid to residents. See, e.g., Fitzhugh Mullan, The Case
for More U.S. Medical Students, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 213, 215 (2000) (“[T]he current
limitation on the number of Medicare-reimbursed residency positions provides a strong
disincentive to expand training programs.”). Sean Nicholson and David Song found in an
empirical study that a $1,000 increase in indirect medical education payment per resident
increased the number of residents hired by 0.12%. They speculated that one possible
reason for the small increase was the constrained supply of residents. Sean Nicholson &
David Song, The Incentive Effects of the Medicare Indirect Medical Education Policy, 20 J.
HEALTH ECON. 909, 928 (2001).
288. See MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 273, at 49 tbl.2A-6
(showing that in 2001 there were 1122 teaching hospitals and 3166 nonteaching
hospitals).
289. COUNCIL ON GRADUATE MED. EDUC., supra note 281, at 2.
290. The fact that government intervention in the medical education market may
complicate the evaluation of antitrust claims is noted by Hammer & Sage, supra note 256,
at 93.
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that before World War II—and thus before the match—first-year
residents worked in return for room and board with minimal
additional compensation.291 The presence of low stipends before
the match cannot conclusively prove that the match does not
depress salaries, because it is possible that post-World War II
salaries would have been even higher had the match not existed.
It does strongly suggest, however, that factors other than the
match—such as the cost and value of training—may be the
source of low stipends.
A
second
methodology
would
involve
comparing
compensation in markets with a match to similar markets that
exist at the same time but do not have a match. Professors
Muriel Niederle and Alvin Roth have shown that internal
medicine subspecialties that use matching mechanisms to fill
fellowship positions (positions that offer training beyond that
provided by residency programs) do not offer salaries
significantly below those of programs that do not use the
match.292 One concern about this methodology is that programs
that choose to adopt the match may differ systematically from
those that do not. For example, if programs believe that the
match facilitates wage suppression, programs subject to upward
pressure on wages would be more likely to adopt the match; if the
programs’ belief were correct, then the match might successfully
lower wages to the levels existing in programs without matches.
The result would be similar wages in both programs, despite the
effect of the match. However, to the extent that the adoption of
matching mechanisms is a result of concerns unconnected to
wages, such as concerns about the problematic consequences of
early offers, this evidence shows that the residency match itself
does not depress compensation.293

291. See Frank Michota, Do Today’s Residents Really Have It Better?, 64 CLEVELAND
CLINIC J. MED. 457 (1997), available at http://www.ccjm.org/1minuteconsults/oct7com.
htm. Ludmerer reports that “house officers received token compensation: from nothing to
$10 a month for interns, and $10 to $25 a month for residents.” LUDMERER, supra note 39,
at 96.
292. Niederle & Roth, supra note 259, at 1153. While concluding that “eliminating
the resident match would not necessarily increase residents’ wages,” the authors also note
the significant differences between fellowship and residency programs. Id. These
differences may preclude the application of insights about fellowship wages to the
residency wage context. See Sanders H. Chae, Correspondence, Is the Match Illegal?, 348
NEW ENG. J. MED. 2255, 2261 (2003) (arguing in response to a letter to the editor that a
labor surplus might produce low salaries in the fellowship market, while there is a labor
shortage in the residency market for American medical graduates). For further research
on gastroenterology fellowships, see generally Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, The
Gastroenterology Fellowship Match: How It Failed and Why It Could Succeed Once Again,
127 GASTROENTEROLOGY 658 (2004).
293. See supra Part III.B (discussing Roth’s research on the problem of market
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Thus, while empirical evidence suggests that resident
compensation is indeed low relative to that of nonresident
physicians and other health care professionals, these differences
may result from factors unrelated to the match, including
differences in productivity, nonmonetary compensation in the
form of medical training, and variations in supply and demand
conditions. (The lawsuit plaintiffs might also argue that the
differences result from the defendants’ sharing of stipend
294
information and various activities of the ACGME, including
295
limits on the number of residency positions, but a full analysis
of these issues is beyond the scope of this Article.) Furthermore,
while not conclusive, empirical evidence comparing compensation
in markets with matching mechanisms to compensation in
markets without matching mechanisms tends to suggest that
such mechanisms do not have a substantial effect on
compensation.296
V. THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION AND OTHER REGULATORY
RESPONSES
The procompetitive justifications for the match and the lack
of empirical evidence of an anticompetitive effect together
suggest that the match should be preserved. The likelihood that
the match is procompetitive, Congress’s concern about the

“unraveling”). Another methodology would involve a comparison of compensation trends
over time in programs adopting or abandoning the match to trends in programs that have
not. No published study appears to have undertaken such an analysis, perhaps because of
data limitations.
294. For example, the AAMC conducts an annual wage survey that may enable
collusion on employment terms by facilitating uniform wage-setting and the monitoring of
deviations from uniformity. See Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 73–82. On the other hand,
the collection of wage information may also benefit competition by giving both residents
and programs the information they need to assess whether their compensation levels
remain competitive.
295. See supra note 2 (describing plaintiff allegations with respect to accreditation
activities); supra note 212 (describing ACGME limitations on residency positions). If the
ACGME limits do constrain the number of residents trained within a specialty, they will
also constrain the number of physicians ultimately practicing within the specialty. Chae,
supra note 1, at 355. The result is that although resident compensation might be less than
the competitive level, residents will face fewer competitors upon completion of the
program and may therefore ultimately obtain compensation at higher levels as
independently practicing physicians. Id. While teaching hospitals may benefit from lower
resident wages in the short run, they may be harmed by higher physician salaries in the
long run. Higher physician salaries will tend to increase hospital expenses if the hospitals
employ physicians. Even if hospitals do not employ physicians, high salaries may harm
hospitals by decreasing demand for physician services that are complementary to hospital
services. Thus, while resident limits may at first seem to benefit teaching programs and
hospitals, it is not clear that in the long run the limits would have such an effect.
296. Niederle & Roth, supra note 259, at 1153.
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“burden and expense of defending against litigation,”297 and its
finding that the match has “effectively served the interests of
medical students, teaching hospitals, and patients for over half a
298
century” justify the grant of an antitrust exemption.
As Senator Kohl observed, however, it is often bad policy to
299
The antitrust laws
provide exemptions to antitrust laws.
protect competition because competition produces many societal
benefits. Concern about undermining these benefits is one reason
why exceptions to antitrust law are so limited. Statutory
exemptions are rare.300 The state action doctrine exempts state
government regulation from antitrust law, but only if “[t]he
challenged activity is authorized by a ‘clearly articulated’ state
regulatory policy,” and “[a]ny private conduct authorized by the
state policy is ‘actively supervised’ by an appropriate
301
governmental agency.” Given our reluctance to grant broad
exceptions to the antitrust laws, it is reasonable to ask whether
the antitrust exemption for the residency match is appropriately
limited.
By attaching to the exemption legislation the label
302
the authors of the
“Confirmation of Antitrust Status,”
legislation were in effect asserting that the exemption was
consistent with the purposes of antitrust law and presumably
with the outcome of a properly decided antitrust suit.
Consistency would require, however, that the antitrust
exemption be limited in scope. Consider the series of arguments
that might be raised if a suit focusing on the match were fully
litigated. The plaintiffs would allege that teaching hospitals
across the country acted together through the residency match to
depress compensation in violation of the Sherman Act. The
defendants would argue in response that the potential of the
match to promote competition by facilitating fully informed
decisionmaking suggests that it should be analyzed under the
rule of reason.303 But the defendants’ ability to offer a
297. 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b(a)(2)(B) (West Supp. 2005). By early 2005, more than 100
attorneys had become involved in the case, and the “teaching medical establishment” was
said to have incurred more than $20 million in litigation-related costs. Croasdale, supra
note 13.
298. 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b(a)(1)(E).
299. 150 CONG. REC. S3979 (daily ed. Apr. 8, 2004) (statement of Sen. Kohl).
300. For a list of such exceptions, see Memorandum from the Immunities &
Exemptions Working Group to All Comm’rs, supra note 16, at 3–5.
301. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 20.3, at 727–28 (2d ed.
1999).
302. 15 U.S.C.A. § 37b.
303. For a more thorough antitrust analysis of the case, see Miller & Greaney, supra
note 1, at 915–16. For a discussion of the application of the rule of reason in general, see
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procompetitive rationale for the operation of the residency
match—the fact that the match may increase “output” by
improving match quality—would not automatically result in a
favorable verdict. Under the standard rule-of-reason analysis, a
seemingly procompetitive restraint may still be deemed an
antitrust violation if the plaintiff can demonstrate that it is not
the least-restrictive alternative.304 One question that might be
asked, then, is whether the procompetitive objectives of the
match might be achieved with a mechanism that is less
restrictive. If so, the exemption should be narrowed to encompass
only the less restrictive alternative.
One argument along these lines is that while the matching
algorithm itself should be subject to the protection of the
exemption, some of the rules that support it should not be. One
might argue, for example, that the rules of the match should be
loosened to permit more contracting outside of it. As discussed in
Parts II and III, match rules can be quite stringent. For example,
residency programs participating in the residency match agree to
305
hire seniors in U.S. medical schools only through the match.
Violations of the match, including refusals to accept a match
assignment, are subject to sanctions, including a prohibition
against match participation and reporting of the violation.306 The
antitrust suit plaintiffs objected to many of these rules.307
Supporters of the plaintiffs might argue that even if the
exemption precludes an antitrust challenge to the operation of
the matching algorithm, it should allow a challenge to some of
the more restrictive rules of the match. The problem with this
argument is that loosening the rules would likely destroy the
residency match. The more positions allocated outside of the
match, the smaller the benefit of the match to match
participants. The more positions allocated outside of the match,
the more pressure participants will feel to consider these
positions, and the more the process will resemble the unraveling
market the match is designed to avoid.
A second frequently articulated less-restrictive-alternative
argument is that the unraveling problem could be avoided
308
entirely through the imposition of rules related to offer timing.
generally 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 1511 (1986).
304. See AREEDA, supra note 303, ¶ 1511, at 429.
305. NRMP, supra note 68, § 4.2.
306. See NRMP, supra note 19, § 7.0 for a discussion of violation sanctions. Match
rules do include some flexibility with respect to participants’ needs. See id. §§ 2.5, 3.4
(contemplating the possibility of waiver of match commitments).
307. Complaint, supra note 1, ¶¶ 85–86.
308. See Crall, supra note 1, at 271–72 (suggesting that coordinated offer timing
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Specifically, the imposition of a date before which programs
would be prohibited from making offers could address the earlyoffer problem, while a mandatory minimum period for holding
offers open could address the exploding-offer problem.309
Advocates of such rules might argue, in fact, that the antitrust
exemption should be completely eliminated because these rules
would achieve all of the benefits of the match in a less restrictive
way.310 Historically, however, such rules have failed.311 As
discussed in subpart III.B, it was the failure of precisely these
sorts of rules that led to the creation of residency match.
While strict enforcement of these rules would ensure that
both programs and residents would have the opportunity to
evaluate potential partners, it would fail to address an important
contributor to the unraveling phenomenon. Because programs
still would face self-imposed or ACGME-imposed resource-based
312
constraints on the number of positions available, they would
still have to make offers sequentially, waiting for a definitive
negative response before making another offer. A hospital that
cannot afford to finance residency positions from its own funds,
for example, would not want to risk making offers (and receiving
acceptances) for more positions than Medicare is willing to
subsidize.313 This means that programs would have to target their
initial offers carefully in order to avoid losing their favored
candidates to other programs. They might choose to make an
offer only to their second-choice candidate, for example, because
they suspect that their first-choice candidate will eventually take
another offer. Residents, meanwhile, would face a choice between
accepting the first position offered them or declining and hoping
that a preferred offer would arrive later. These are once again
the problems the match is designed to avoid. Imposition of
deadlines alone could not achieve the procompetitive benefits of
the match.
On the other hand, it may be possible to enhance the
procompetitive benefits of the match by increasing competition
inside of it. First, programs should be required to disclose

would be a less restrictive means of “keeping transaction costs low, avoiding
informational problems, and eliminating externalities”).
309. See, e.g., id. (suggesting that hospitals be required to “make their offers by a
certain date” and “hold offers open until a certain later date”).
310. Id. at 271–74 (arguing that regulation of offer dates and acceptance deadlines is
a less restrictive means of achieving the benefits of the match).
311. See Roth, supra note 57, at 993–95.
312. See supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing residency position limits).
313. See supra Part IV (discussing the financing of medical residency positions,
including the cap on the number of Medicare-subsidized positions).
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compensation levels and other terms of employment before the
ranking deadline. If programs disclose compensation only after
the matching process, competitive pressure is limited: Once
matched, residents are contractually committed to join the
assigned residency program, their second-choice programs are
likely full, and other possibilities (such as waiting for next year’s
match, or pursuing another profession) are undesirable. If
programs always disclosed their compensation packages before
the ranking deadline, on the other hand, prospective residents
could easily compare these packages across programs and take
this information into account when compiling their rank-order
lists. Programs currently are free to provide compensation terms
before the ranking deadline, and most likely do.314 A disclosure
requirement would ensure that all programs provided such
information, however, and not just upon the request of individual
applicants who might be reluctant to ask. In recognition of the
merits of such a policy, the NRMP recently adopted a rule that
requires programs to provide a sample of the contract applicants
would be expected to sign upon being matched to the residency
program.315
Because such disclosure is critical to the effective
functioning of the matching mechanism, Congress should
incorporate into the antitrust exemption statute a similar
requirement that programs provide all interviewed applicants a
copy of the actual contract that they would be expected to sign. If
structured as a condition for the exemption, the requirement
would give an additional incentive for programs to provide
compensation information. If the programs failed to comply, thus
reducing the procompetitive benefits of the match, plaintiffs
could then bring an antitrust action similar to the one brought by
316
former residents in 2002. Alternatively, Congress could create
an independent mandate of disclosure, and give antitrust
enforcement agencies (or the Department of Health and Human
Services) the power to enforce it through fines or other measures.

314. Many disclose this information on program websites or through the Fellowship
and Residency Electronic Interactive Database (FREIDA). See, e.g., Am. Med. Ass’n,
FREIDA Online, http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/2997.html (last visited Oct.
1, 2005).
315. See supra note 65 (describing the current NRMP rule on sample contracts); see
also Press Release, Nat’l Residency Matching Program, NRMP Requires Medical
Residency Programs to Show Contracts to Applicants (Oct. 31, 2003), available at http://
www.nrmp.org/contractpr.pdf (reporting that the new rule requiring the provision of
sample contracts would be effective in 2005).
316. See generally Complaint, supra note 1.
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Either alternative would permit enforcement approaches more
expansive than those currently available to the NRMP.
To achieve the maximum possible competitive benefit, it is
imperative that program disclosures be accurate. In other words,
the “sample contract” should not just be a representative
example of the type of contract that the resident would be
expected to sign, but instead an actual offer of a contingent
contract. By submitting a rank-order listing that contains a
particular program’s name, the resident would accept the
program’s offer, forming a contingent contract. If the parties are
successfully matched, they would then be bound to comply with
the terms of the contingent contract. If a resident’s submission of
rankings indeed constitutes an acceptance of all contingent
contract offers, the resident will necessarily be able to compile
rankings based on full and accurate information about program
terms. The match’s competitive potential will be realized.
Until recently, however, the creation of contingent contracts
appears to have been prohibited. Match rules expressly
prohibited the formation of “any verbal or written contract”
317
before the match; presumably, this broad prohibition would
have applied to contingent contracts. Prohibitions on contingent
contracting, however, are not necessary to achieve the
318
procompetitive benefits of the residency match; elimination of
the prohibition would thus be consistent with antitrust doctrine
requiring that a procompetitive restraint be the least restrictive
alternative. The recent NRMP requirement for disclosure of
sample contracts, if interpreted to mandate adherence to sample
contract terms, would seem to have eliminated this prohibition.319
The federal antitrust exemption should reinforce this result by
mandating that programs enter contracts contingent on the
outcome of the match.
Another way to increase competition without undermining
the match would be to encourage the creation of individualized
contingent contracts. Rather than posting a sample contract with
terms that would apply to all residents, programs could

317. NRMP, supra note 68, § 8.0.
318. See Hammer & Sage, supra note 256, at 93 (“[S]pecific details of the NRMP,
such as prohibitions on negotiating terms of employment prior to matching, are troubling
because they go beyond the type of ancillary restriction necessary to achieve the
program’s legitimate goals.”).
319. An NRMP policy that did not mandate program adherence to sample contract
terms would likely be less effective in increasing competition. Concerns about developing
a reputation for deviating from sample contract terms may still encourage programs to
adopt the sample contract as the actual contract, however, thus preserving the benefits of
competition even in the absence of a mandate.
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announce minimum stipends or stipend ranges, but then provide
individualized sample contracts to each interviewed applicant. To
the extent that these individualized sample contracts also
contained individualized stipends, they would facilitate the
competitive process. For example, the compensation offered
would provide some evidence of the program’s intensity of
preference for a particular resident.320 In circumstances in which
residents’ preferences depend on programs’ preferences for them,
this information would help residents make more fully informed
decisions. Residents could also use the information contained in
individualized contracts as a tool to negotiate better offers from
other programs. Admittedly, contingent contracts are less than
ideal for both of these purposes because they are not necessarily
credible. Programs’ rank-orders need not correspond to the level
of compensation offered; indeed, programs could offer excellent
employment terms to all applicants, but then exclude some
applicants from their ranking lists. To the extent that programs
are concerned about filling their slots, however, they will include
as many acceptable candidates as possible on their rank-order
lists. In addition, transaction costs associated with
individualizing contracts may discourage programs from
providing contracts to candidates they do not intend to rank. In
either case, the individualized contracts would facilitate
competition.
Individualized compensation would mitigate a number of the
concerns that have been raised in connection with the residency
match. Both of the theoretical economic studies showing the
relationship between matching mechanisms and wage depression
focus on systems under which programs cannot distinguish
320. Because compensation offers, like rank-order lists, provide information about
participants’ preferences and intentions, it is reasonable to ask why the same rules should
not apply to both. In particular, pre-match solicitation of rank-orderings from match
participants is prohibited. See supra note 71 and accompanying text. Why should
compensation information be treated differently? There are at least two justifications for
prohibiting solicitation of ranking information. First, if the ranking information provided
is incorrect or vague when given, or becomes incorrect due to later modification, then the
prohibition prevents unethical behavior and ensures that participants are not misled.
Second, if the ranking information is correct, then the prohibition prevents unraveling. If
programs are permitted to make binding commitments to a particular ranking, then
candidates must be sure to interview before the program makes commitments to other
interviewees. The result is the same chain of events the match is intended to prevent.
Neither of these two concerns applies to contingent offers of compensation. First, because
the contract is binding if a match is made, there is no risk of a party being misled about
compensation. Second, because there is no necessary connection between salary offers and
rankings, because programs’ financial exposure is limited by the number of residency
slots offered through the match, and because budgets may be somewhat flexible, one high
contingent offer of compensation need not preclude another. Thus, disclosure of
compensation information need not induce unraveling.
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among candidates in setting their wages.321 But when
compensation is allowed to vary in Bulow and Levin’s model, the
matching mechanism achieves the efficient result.322 Similarly,
individualized wages address the ordinal ranking concern raised
by Professor Priest by allowing cardinal expressions of
preferences.323 Programs can indicate the strength of their
preferences through individualized compensation offers in
addition to rankings, thus preventing the match from making
inefficient assignments of residents to programs.
It is not clear that residency programs would choose to
individualize employment terms. From an efficiency perspective,
if all residents selected by a program had similar characteristics,
there would be little reason to vary employment terms. Lack of
proven variation in productive capabilities may be one reason
that residents within a program are generally offered the same
compensation. On the other hand, it cannot explain why
compensation often does not vary across programs within an
institution. Third-year residents in surgery programs may
receive the same compensation as third-year residents in
internal medicine programs, despite significant differences in the
incomes of independent physicians in these specialties.324 The
tendency of similarities in compensation to persist despite
differences in skill sets may instead be due to expectations of
“fair” treatment within an institution. Administering
compensation packages may be less costly when they are
consistent across employees, in part because the need to monitor
for favoritism is reduced.325 Many employers offer similar
compensation levels to their workers, despite potentially

321. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. Kamecke suggests that when
programs do not offer individualized wages, there may be no wage that equates supply
and demand; the result is “disorderly behavior” that is then addressed by a matching
mechanism. See Kamecke, supra note 80, at 34. The Kamecke model assumes that wages
within programs are uniform, and states that “it is the major objective of the paper to
discuss the consequences of this restriction on the wage formation in an organized entrylevel job market.” See id. at 37.
322. See supra text accompanying note 174.
323. See supra Part III.C.3 (explaining Priest’s argument that matching mechanisms
based only on ordinal expressions of preferences can result in inefficiency).
324. For example, the Baylor College of Medicine Program pays $41,517 to third-year
residents in both the internal medicine and surgery programs; the University of
Minnesota Program pays $44,630 to third-year residents in both programs. See Am. Med.
Ass’n, supra note 314 (providing detailed program information about the characteristics of
individual residency programs).
325. See Susan J. Stabile, Motivating Executives: Does Performance-Based
Compensation Positively Affect Managerial Performance?, 2 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 227,
259 (1999).
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observable differences in worker quality.326 For these reasons, it
is not obvious that residency programs would, or even necessarily
should, choose to individualize employment terms.
Given the potential benefits of individualized compensation
for competition, however, regulators should facilitate
individualized contracting for programs inclined to engage in it.
In addition to potentially increasing efficiency, individualized
contracting would make both express and tacit collusion much
more difficult relative to a system under which institutions
offered the same contract to all residents participating in the
institutions’ programs. Variations in compensation levels would
complicate any efforts by independent institutions to agree upon
a single level of compensation, or to enforce adherence to such an
agreement.
A contingent contract mandate might itself encourage
individualized contracting by encouraging open discussion of
contract terms before rankings are submitted. Mandating that
the contingent contracts be individualized—requiring that they
include the applicant’s name and signature, for example—might
further facilitate the tailoring of compensation packages. While
programs might still choose to offer the same compensation
package to each of their applicants, the mandate would provide a
natural opening for more compensation negotiation than would
otherwise exist. The mandate would serve as an opportunity for
programs to depart from any norms that might inefficiently
discourage individual negotiation. Programs could publicize
minimum compensation or compensation ranges on their
websites or through the FREIDA database, so that prospective
applicants would have general information about compensation
before they apply, but then supplement this information with the
individualized sample contract. It would not be appropriate,
though, to actually mandate tailored compensation. Such a
mandate would not likely be administrable,327 and individualized
compensation might in some cases be determined to be inefficient
or unfair. A mandate to provide individualized contingent
contracts, however, might eventually increase the frequency of

326. See, e.g., Stephen Machin & Alan Manning, A Test of Competitive Labor Market
Theory: The Wage Structure Among Care Assistants in the South of England, 57 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 371, 371–74 (2004) (finding “surprisingly little wage dispersion within
firms” despite the effective lack of “external constraints on the wage-setting process”). For
discussions of the practice of uniform compensation and its potential causes, see, for
example, Bulow & Levin, supra note 82, at 27, and MANNING, supra note 241, at 134–36.
327. For instance, how much would resident compensation packages be required to
vary?
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negotiation over compensation packages and thus improve
competition within the residency match system.
VI. CONCLUSION
The antitrust suit filed by former medical residents against
organizations that operate and participate in the residency
match raised important questions about the process of graduate
medical education in the United States. Residency training
demands multiple years of work for long hours at compensation
lower than that of other medical professionals. By preventing the
creation of credible firm offers to individual residents, the
residency match weakens individual residents’ ability to
negotiate better compensation. Economic theory suggests that
under certain assumptions matching mechanisms may depress
compensation and impede the efficient functioning of markets
relative to a competitive ideal.
On the other hand, market imperfections and market
failures almost certainly would prevent the realization of this
ideal. The residency match is a market intervention that
promotes competition by assuring market participants a wide
range of potential partners and an opportunity for fully informed
decisionmaking. The residency match helps to achieve a more
efficient pairing of residents and programs than would be
generated by an unraveling market, perhaps contributing to
higher resident compensation than would otherwise exist, and
likely increasing gains to society as a whole. Given these
arguments and the considerable cost of litigation, the
congressional grant of an antitrust exemption is justified.
Having sacrificed the protections provided by the antitrust
laws, however, Congress has now taken on the responsibility for
protecting the public against anticompetitive behavior. It is
unfortunate that the antitrust exemption was enacted without a
full airing of the arguments on both sides of the residency debate.
Much remains to be understood about the nature and magnitude
of the effects of the match. When Congress created a retroactive
antitrust exemption, it likely precluded an exploration of these
issues through litigation. It should therefore now actively study
the effects of the match, and work to promote competition
through measures such as a legislative requirement for preranking deadline offers of contingent contracts to individual
match participants.
In its roles as a payer for medical education, a purchaser of
care, and a protector of the public interest, Congress should
consider the effect of market interventions such as the match on
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the welfare of not just residents and residency programs, but also
the public as a whole. In a market characterized by failures and
imperfections, market interventions may improve social welfare.
Continued vigilance is required to ensure that they actually do
so.

